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George Bush's America Meets Dante's Inferno:
The Americans with Disabilities Act in Prison
Ira P. Robbinst
Let the shameful wall of exclusion finally come tumbling down.
President George Bush,
Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act
July 26, 1990
Inmates may not be discriminatedagainst on the basis of race,
religion, nationality, sex, disability, or political belief.
Policy of Non-Discrimination Toward Inmates
Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Department of Justice
28 C.F.R. § 551.90 (1996)
All hope abandon, ye who enter here ....
Dante Alighieri, The Inferno
Canto III
The conditions in America's correctional facilities have long been cause for
concern. Even those who do not advocate a comfortable quality of life for
inmates recognize that basic problems such as overcrowding, inmate violence,'
inadequate staffing, 2 and increasing costs of building and maintaining prisons
have approached crisis levels. Meanwhile, the prison population continues to
swell. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the United States
Department of Justice, the number of prisoners incarcerated at state and federal
prisons annually has grown at a rate of 8.4% in recent years.' This prison
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1. See John Hurst & Dan Morain, A System Strains at Its Bars, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at A1
("California prisons remain dangerous. Knifings are common. Convicts kill four or five of their fellows
a year. Guards kill a like number.").
2. See id. ("Prison officials acknowledge that an inmate might wait as long as three months to see
one of five physicians who serve the 4,000 convicts.").
3. See Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justie Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Executive
Summary, CorrectionalPopulationsin the United States, 1993 (lastmodified Oct. 1995) < http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/pub/bjs/ascii/cupus93ex.txt>. For a report on the prison population explosion, see Pierre
Thomas, U.S. Prison Population, Continuing Rapid Growth Since '80s, Surpasses I Million, WASH.
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population explosion has been linked to harsher sentencing guidelines and
"three strikes and you're out" provisions. According to sources at the
Department of Justice, however, this prison population growth has resulted
from a "'dramatic increase in the number of people arrested and admitted to
the corrections system and not a growth in the length of sentences and the
length of stay in prison.'"' Whichever viewpoint is more accurate, America
imprisons more people every day.
This national trend exacerbates the problems that disabled prisoners5
encounter, problems considerably unknown to the general population. Disabled
prisoners are particularly susceptible to discrimination and oppression within
the penal system, prey to the whims of correction officers and fellow inmates.
Despite these vulnerabilities, they must be incarcerated. While some citizens
might agree that every individual deserves certain basic necessities, many also
would argue that the government should prioritize the weal of law-abiding
people over that of convicts in an age of shrinking budgets. However,
relatively few pay attention to the manner in which American courts augment
the punishment accorded disabled defendants, stripping them of their human
dignity in prison:
If I told you about a human rights case involving men who are kept locked in filthy
urine-soaked cells for 23 out of 24 hours, who aren't allowed to take showers,
whose water is shut off in their cells so they can neither drink nor wash, whose
bodies have large deep open festering sores that receive no medical care
whatsoever, nor do any of the prisoners' other urgent medical crises (no doctors are
stationed on this unit, nor do any make rounds), men who are prevented from using
their toilets and forced to urinate on themselves or their bedclothes.... If I told
you that prison guards periodically throw urine and feces on them, taunt them by
calling them jeering names over a loudspeaker, beat them .... Got your attention,
haven't I? . .. [M]y link to these cases was not Amnesty International, and no, I'm
not talking about Turkey or Guatemala. The country in question is America, Land
of the Free.'

Another commentator describes filthy conditions and appalling neglect:
Two days after he filed a complaint about conditions for disabled prisoners at
Stillwater prison, paraplegic inmate Douglas Hausmann was placed in a segregation
cell for nine days, where he was left to lie in his excrement. He fell several times

PosT, Oct. 28, 1994, at A3.
4. Thomas, supra note 3, at A3 (quoting Allen J. Beck, who helped prepare Justice Department's
Sourcebook of CriminalJustice Statistics in 1993).
5. Disabled pretrial detainees present additional concerns. While they share the same physical
problems as disabled prisoners, disabled pretrial detainees occupy a more privileged status within the
legal system. Public sympathy is generally greater, and deference to institutional interests is generally
less, where the rights of pretrial detainees are involved. See infra Section I.B.
6. Jean Stewart, Inside Abuse: Disability and Oppression Behind Bars, DISABILrrY RAG &
RESOURCE, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 1.

The Americans with Disabilities Act in Prison
from the bed, sprained his arm and hit his head so hard that it required x-rays to
determine the extent of his injuries ...
Because guards could not fit the wheelchair into a cell, he was left outside the
cell for about 45 minutes, Hausmann said he defecated in his clothing before guards
placed him on the toilet. He was ordered to remove his clothes and after about 11/2 hours, crawled down from the toilet onto the floor.
He said he pulled a mattress and lay naked in his own waste for another hour
before a nurse cleaned him. He said he remained on the bed for the next six days
before he was taken for a shower. He stayed on the bed for another three days after
that, falling from it six times and defecating in his pants three times despite requests
for help, he said. 7

Additional reports, sporadically issued in various national newspapers, make
much the same case.8
By contrast, other writers offer rather pastoral portrayals of inmate
populations cared for by well-intentioned professionals at the various
corrections departments. 9 Articles in Corrections Today, a prison industry
publication, suggest a longstanding problem of serious, yet less than horrific,

7. Mark Brunswick, Inmate Questions Treatment ofDisabled, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),

May 18, 1991, at lB. Brunswick's harrowing report is far from unique. In Inside Abuse, Jean Stewart
details her encounters with disabled inmates at Shawangunk Correctional Facility in Wallkill, New York.
She became involved with a lawsuit filed on behalf of Easton Beckford, Peter Grassia, and another
wheelchair-bound inmate. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 4. Already disabled and wheelchair-bound,
Beckford alleges he was severely beaten after he testified against a guard at his prior facility. At
Shawangunk, his leg braces and wrist support were confiscated, and "grab bars were denied in his cell
on the grounds that no metal objects were permitted in [the special housing unit]." Id. at 4-5. Beckford
presented an increasingly standard list of complaints: inaccessible toilet and shower facilities, denial of
catheters and leg bags, etc. See id. at 6-7. Grassia experienced similar problems, including a wrongly
sized wheelchair, erratic medication for spasms, denial of physiotherapy, and use of a security restraint
device called "the black box" that when used on paraplegics, prone to spasms, "becomes an ingeniously
medieval instrument of torture." Id. at 7. For both inmates, life at Shawangunk has been a combination
of steady verbal (and allegedly physical) abuse by the guards and constant medical crises of severe pain
and potential infection. See id. at 7-8.
8. See, e.g., Hurst & Morain, supra note 1 (reporting California case, settled by Department of
Corrections (DOC), in which female inmate died of acute pancreatitis and was found lying in her cell,
caked with feces); Dan Morain, Calfornia's PrisonBudget: Why Is It So Voracious?, L.A. TIMES, Oct.

19, 1994, at Al (discussing recent California case, settled by DOC, in which epileptic inmate convicted
of second-degree murder was denied necessary medication and suffered more than 100 seizures over 20month period, subsequently dying of grand mal seizure).
9. See, e.g., Judy C. Anderson, South Carolina Strives to Treat Elderly and DisabledOffenders,

CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug. 1991, at 124; Scarlett V. Carp & Joyce A. Davis, Planningand Designing
a Facility for a Special Needs Population, CORRECTIONs TODAY. Apr. 1991, at 100 ("[P]rison
populations are not just growing larger-they are growing more diverse as well."): id. at 188 ("Creating
a therapeutic environment requires attention to interior design. A 'soft' environment that includes natural
light, wood plants and earth tone color schemes is recommended."); Joann B. Morton, Training Staff
to Work with Elderly and DisabledInmates, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Feb. 1993, at 42 ("With the number
of special needs offenders growing, correctional programs, services and supervision must be designed
or modified to fit these offenders' diverse needs."); Carol B. Shauffer & Loren M. Warboys, Helping
the Handicapped:It's the Law, CORRECTIONS TODAY, June 1987, at70 ("Because handicapped persons
are overrepresented in local, state, and federal corrections institutions, facility administrators have
become increasingly aware of their specialobligationto offenders with handicaps.") (emphasis added).
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dimensions.' ° Each version of correctional America undoubtedly contains
some truth. Somewhere, aging and disabled inmates coexist peaceably with
guards and prison regimens. Nevertheless, one should not dismiss harrowing
accounts as simply extremist.
Disabled inmates must cope with problems endemic to being a prisoner, as
well as disadvantages inherent in their disabilities. Public perceptions of
inmates worsen daily both inside and outside prisons. While potential criminals
frighten us, convicted criminals allow us the empowerment of safe hatred.
Guards and administrators, too, often hold inmates in the lowest esteem:
The attitude from the central office in Sacramento is these inmates don't deserve
the cost of the medical services spent on them .... They aren't considered to be
viable life forms by the department administration-they are just inmates ....

The

only time the problem comes into focus is when someone dies."

Attitudes inside prisons, while occasionally more openly hostile, are
generally matched and echoed throughout the country. Calculated political
maneuvering has combined with anxiety about seemingly rampant crime to
engender harsh theories of almost entirely punitive prison systems. Moreover,
more than a few of these inmates have committed crimes that reinforce
society's negative impression of them.' 2
The national political climate is demanding longer sentences and the
restriction or elimination of parole. The Governor of Virginia, for example,
recently leveraged a strict crime bill that abolished parole and increased
sentences for violent crimes by as much as 500%.11 The costs associated with
such programs have not yet dimmed post-1994 election year enthusiasm, but
those costs have been cited with some regularity. 14

10. See sources cited supra note 9; see also Anderson, supra note 9, at 124 ("Fortunately, the
South Carolina Department of Corrections has been aware of older offenders' special needs since
1970 . . . ."); Herbert A. Rosenfield, Issues to Consider in Meeting Handicapped Offenders' Needs,
CORRECTIONs TODAY, Oct. 1992, at 110 ("After all, the problem is not a new one; all that's new is the

amount of attention it is receiving.").
11. Susan Sward & Bill Wallace, Health CrisisBehind Bars;Ailing PrisonInmatesSufferfrom Lack
of Care, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 3, 1994, at Al.
12. One example of the public's antipathy toward inmates is the predisposition to believe that
inmate injuries and health problems are not genuine. This perception can have disastrous effects in cases
in which an inmate is legitimately injured. In one instance, a parole violator at San Quentin was
assaulted by other inmates, suffering spinal cord damage, paralysis, and nervous shock. The prison
guards assumed he was faking injury and left him on the floor for six days before coming to his aid.
See Deplorable Medical Carefor State's Prisons, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8, 1994, at A22.
13. See Peter Baker, Assembly RatifiesAllen's Assault on Violent Crime: Work on Payingfor Parole
Plan Is Put on Hold Until Next Year, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1994, at Cl. Governor Allen's program will
mandate that convicts serve at least 85 % of their sentence and that violent offenders serve considerably
longer sentences across the board. See id. The result is a need for additional correctional facilities. See
id.
14. See Charles Babington, Voter Sentiments PromptReview ofAnti-Crime Legislation: CampaignConsciousMd. Lawmakers PushLimited Parole,WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1994, at D 1. Maryland Governor
William Donald Schaefer's staff projected that elimination of parole would create $400 million in new

The Americans with Disabilities Act in Prison
The American public is convinced that locking up criminals for longer
terms will reduce the threat of crime. The media notes the predicament of
institutionalized criminals in passing, 5 with only an occasional plea for
decency in prison settings. One rather perverse consequence of the boom in
prison building has been the creation of jobs, investment opportunities, 6 and
what a New York newspaper referred to as "constituencies-architects,
contractors, vendors, labor unions, whole communities-with a vested interest
in maintaining the status quo."' 7 The 1994 Federal Crime Bill provided nearly
$7.9 billion for state prison and boot-camp construction, rendering the sprawl
of prison building a decidedly national phenomenon. 8 Prisoners petition
courts for relief, citing conditions that, in addition to approaching cruel and
unusual punishment, conspicuously violate disability laws. These same courts,
however, are increasingly denied the discretion in sentencing that is necessary
to alleviate some of the problems. Meanwhile, prisoners such as Easton
Beckford,' 9 Peter Grassia,20 and Douglas Hausmann2 are still looking for

prison construction expense. See id. Stuart Comstock-Gay, Executive Director of the ACLU of
Maryland, projected that the state would pay millions to support an aging, no-longer-dangerous inmate
population. See id.; see also Bush Rethinks the Needfor 50,000 PrisonBeds, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 28,
1994, at 5B (noting Florida gubernatorial candidate Jeb Bush's plan to require that inmates serve 85%
of sentences, and accommodating resulting additional 8000 inmates by operating Florida prisons at 150 %
capacity).
California will confront catastrophically high expenses in years to come, if analysts are correct.
Projecting that the state would spend $3.1 billion in 1994 for prison operations, the Department of
Corrections and the RAND Corporation anticipated a doubling of the prison population and the
corrections expense by the year 2000, if "three strikes" provisions are strictly enforced. See Morain,
supra note 8, at Al; see also Anthony Lewis, Sunlight and Shadow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1996, at
A15 ("As recently as 15 years ago [California] spent six times as much on higher education as on
prisons. Last year the prison budget was larger-and the disparity is going to grow.") Construction costs
to build prisons necessitated by three-strikes law will be approximately $5 billion. See id.
15. The Peter Grassia story, see supra note 7, received limited print coverage following the filing
of the lawsuit. See Jay Matthews, Under a New Law, A Rising Sensitivity To DisabledInmates?, WASH.
POsT, Nov. 24, 1993, at A4.
16. See Dan Morain, Three Strikes Law Will Boost Wall Street Firms That Sell Bonds to Finance
Construction, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1994, at 16 ("[California State Treasurer Kathleen Brown] sold
prison bonds in denominations as small as $250 as part of a program to help families save for college
tuition.").
17. Steven A. Holmes, Prisons Replacing Military As Nation's Hot Growth Area, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Nov. 13, 1994, at 17A; see also Hurst & Morain, supra note 1, at A10 ("It's
a machine that will chew you up .... There is no sense of rehabilitation. It's a multibillion-dollar
industry, and we're the commodities.") (quoting "lifer" Luis Rodriguez, Pelican Bay State Prison); Dan
Morain, California'sProfusionofPrisons, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1994, at 1 (noting that, in past decade,
California Department of Corrections has added 40,524 prison cells and dormitory beds. built 16 prisons
and renovated existing facilities, and committed $5 billion to planning, engineering, and construction
of new prisons-amount that will nearly double as consequence of bond debt). The willingness of
California's officials to continue this trend is unmistakable. See id. Seventy-three million dollars has
been paid to the state's main consultant for management of construction since 1982. See id.
18. See Holmes, supra note 17. California officials expect the number of state prisons to increase
from 58 to 78; Florida projects eight new prisons, expansion at 22 existing facilities, and four work
camps by the year 2000. See id. "Texas officials say they plan to open a new corrections installation
each week for the next 18 months." Id. (emphasis added).
19. See supra note 7.
20. See supra note 7.
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relief from conditions of neglect that arguably reach unconstitutional
proportions.
In July 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)' became law
after surviving intense congressional scrutiny. The ADA built on the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,23 expanding both the guarantees and the breadth
of the earlier legislation. 24 It recognized an unprecedented right of access on
behalf of disabled Americans.
While the ADA was enacted to prevent discrimination against disabled
individuals, its applicability as a remedy to disabled prisoners is subject to
debate. Critical to understanding why the ADA is not clearly applicable to
prisoners is an awareness that prisoners' "rights" are unlike any other rights.
Legal professionals and scholars alike recognize the peculiar substance of the
quasi-rights accorded prison inmates, individuals incarcerated by the judgment
of their peers and the legal system. This context colors the potential applicability of statutory rights such as those incorporated in the ADA.
Finding systematic responses to the difficulties associated with disabled
prisoners challenges even the most beneficent prison administrations. Both
prisoners' rights advocates and prison administrators must confront a broad
spectrum of disabilities. One might immediately think of paraplegics,
wheelchairs, amputees, etc.; but disabilities also include blindness, hearing
impairment, mental retardation, mental illness, and other health problems.
Often the most effective solutions for accommodating disabled prisoners
conflict with security and administrative concerns, as well as, of course, lack
of funding. 2 The history of deference to prison management, the conflict
between punishment and rehabilitation as purposes of incarceration, and the
unwillingness of elected legislatures to fight for basic decency in the care of
convicted criminals have combined to make judicial relief for prisoners the
exception rather than the rule. Insofar as the ADA provides a more powerful
and accessible tool for obtaining such relief, it is an incredibly important
resource for prisoners.

21. See supra text accompanying note 7.
22. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994)) [hereinafter ADA].
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994).
24. See infra Sections U.B, III.A (discussing Rehabilitation Act).
25. Even with national enthusiasm for increasingly harsh crime bills, the costs of prison
construction daunt taxpayers. The near failure of Virginia Governor Allen's efforts to eliminate parole
was attributed in large part to the costs of the prison construction that would result. See infra Part VI
(discussing financial crisis facing correctional systems). Given the unwillingness to expend resources
for new prisons, the likelihood that costly structural adjustments that improve the quality of prisoners'
lives will be made is slight. Even with legislative mandates for these upgrades, it will require creative
genius on the part of prison directors and the criminal justice system to implement solutions within the
cost constraints imposed by a mercurial electorate that favors both greater crime control and less
government spending.

The Americans with Disabilities Act in Prison
While commentary analyzing the ADA and its implications abounds, few
articles have considered its impact upon American correctional facilities. 26
Those that have done so, however, have operated on the assumption that the
statutory authority of the ADA necessarily overrides the traditional deference
of federal courts to correctional interests. This is a significant and controversial
leap, one that this Article seeks to clarify.
Part I assesses the applicability of certain provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act to the particular problems posed by elderly, mentally disabled,
HIV-infected, and hearing-impaired inmates, as well as by pretrial detainees
and death-row inmates. Part II provides the historical and statutory background
preceding the enactment of the ADA. Part III sets forth the substance of the
ADA's requirements and briefly discusses their applicability to the prison
context. Part IV considers the legal implications of Title II of the ADA with
respect to establishing violations and pursuing remedies. Part V hypothesizes
how the courts will respond to the ADA in light of their tendency to accord
deference to correctional administrators in institutional matters. Part VI reviews
the significant ADA-based cases to date, concluding that whatever application
of the ADA in the prison context does occur will be highly restrained and
cautious. Part VII surveys alternative methods for solving the problems of
disabled prisoners, including early-release programs, increased transfer to
medical facilities, and centralized facilities for disabled inmates. Despite these
alternatives, this Part recommends placing added emphasis on medical care for
the disabled within the existing prison system. Finally, the Article concludes
that, like constitutional rights, statutory rights such as those purportedly
accorded by the ADA dissipate once incarceration takes hold. Therefore, while
the ADA may be a potential remedy for disabled prisoners at present, the
prospects for the future are uncertain.
I.

SPECIFIC DISABLED PRISON POPULATIONS

Disabled prisoners pose unique problems relative to the general prisoner
population. Moreover, particular segments of the disabled prisoner population
have more specialized concerns than others, and not all disabilities can be
remedied in the same manner. Aging prisoners, mentally disabled prisoners,

26. For a preliminary assessment of the effects of ADA on prisons, see Elaine Gardner, The Legal
Rights of Inmates with Physical Disabilities, 14 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 175, 177-99 (1994). The
article surveys structural and operational changes that full implementation of ADA in prisons could
require. However, Gardner assumes that the statutory authority driving ADA overrides the traditional
separateness of prison condition litigation. That assumption is itself controversial. In November 1994
(after Gardner's article went to press), for example, the Ninth Circuit held in Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d
1439, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1994), see infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text, that statutory authority
falls prey to the Turner reasonableness standard when applied to prisons. See infra Section V.B.
(discussing four-part test of Turner v. Safley). More recently, the Fourth Circuit questioned anew the
application of the ADA to state correctional facilities. See infra notes 276-281 and accompanying text.
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prisoners with HIV, and hearing-impaired prisoners all present particular
difficulties requiring particular remedies.27
A. Disabled Prisoners
1.

Elderly

The average age of American prisoners is rising. With harsher mandatory
sentencing guidelines as well as "three strikes and you're out" provisions, the
criminal justice system confronts an increasingly geriatric incarcerated
constituency.28 Older prisoners are not necessarily disabled, but they are far
more likely to be disabled, to become disabled, or to develop conditions that
require special accommodation. The financial implications of this trend are
ominous. The cost of incarcerating older prisoners, especially for medical care,
greatly exceeds that of younger inmates.29 While existing prisons were built
in anticipation of younger, abler populations, the increased number of older
prisoners 3° combines with the structural requirements of disability legislation
to increase expenses. In addition, as with many younger disabled inmates,
older prisoners are easy targets for inmate violence. 3 Lending a final sense
of futility is the awareness of correctional officials that geriatric inmates are
frequently incarcerated for nonviolent or minimally violent offenses and have
long since ceased to present a threat to society.32
2.

Mentally Disabled

Mental illness33 and mental retardation34 are also significant disabilities.
The ADA provides characteristically broad coverage of mental disabilities, with
27. While some would contend that these prisoners have special concerns, others argue that the
purpose of the ADA was to present a level playing field rather than to give certain individuals particular
benefits. Until this debate between equal protection and special needs is settled, it is unclear what role
the ADA should play in the prison context.
28. See Bill Miller, Making Old Folks at Home Behind Bars: Corrections Officials Try to
Accommodate a Rising Number of Elderly Inmates, WASH. PosT, Dec. 29, 1993, at B1 ("Nationwide,
the number of older prisoners-defined by corrections specialists as offenders age 50 and up-has more
than doubled since the mid-1980s. More than 45,000 state and federal prisoners are 50 or older, and
specialists believe the number will balloon up to 125,000 by 2000.").
29. See id.; see also Miles Corwin, Doing Time in a Jailfor Ol-Timers, L.A. TIMES, May 6,
1994, at 1 (estimating annual medical costs of $125,000 for one 67-year-old inmate and stating that
older prisoners cost about $60,000 per year-three times more than cost for younger inmates).
30. See Miller, supra note 28, at B1.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, Standard 7-10.1(b) (Definitions)
(1984) ("A prisoner who suffers a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or
memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, or the capacity to recognize reality or the ability
to meet the demands of life is referred to within this part as a severely mentally ill prisoner.").
34. See id. Standard 7-10.1(c) ("A prisoner with very significant subaverage general intellectual
functioning existing concurrently with substantial deficits in adaptive behavior is referred to within this
part as a seriously mentally retarded prisoner.").

The Americans with Disabilities Act in Prison
certain exceptions.35 The mentally disabled inmate population presents several
unique and complex problems for prison management generally36 and for
application of the ADA in particular.37
First, the entire phenomenon of mental disabilities challenges traditional
methods of thinking and evaluation. Where it is possible to assess physical
disabilities and the degree to which they impede typical daily functions, it is
far more difficult to appreciate, identify, or, in any useful sense, quantify
mental disabilities. The plethora of scientific writing notwithstanding, mental
states-their nature, their validity, and their implications-continue to elude
clear and complete understanding. Until relatively recently, the criminal justice
system effectively avoided or overlooked many of the complexities presented
by mentally disabled defendants and inmates.38
Prisons regard mental-disability claims with resident suspicion.39 Moreover, in understaffed, increasingly demanding prison environments, the time
and patience required to address mental-disability issues adequately is difficult

35. The definition for disability includes mental impairments. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
As with physical disabilities, the original text of the ADA does not provide extensive lists or discussion
of the mental disabilities covered. The Department of Justice's Final Rule expanded on this to provide
an illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of qualifying conditions: "It also means any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities." 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1994). The exceptions noted in the rule include,
but are not limited to, sexual orientation, personality traits, and cultural disadvantages. See id.
36. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 319-20 (1982) (pointing out that state bears
certain responsibilities, including provision of reasonable care and minimum levels of safety, when it
confines mentally retarded individuals).
37. See Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 248 (7th Cir. 1996). Chief Judge Richard Posner
expressed doubt that the ADA should apply to prisons: "[T]here are formidable practical objections to
burdening prisons with having to comply with the onerous requirements of the Act, especially when we
reflect that alcoholism and other forms of addiction are disabilities within the meaning of the Act and
afflict a substantial proportion of the prison population." Id.
38. For a good discussion of the problems associated with the mentally disabled prisoner
population, as well as examples of the conditions they face, see Connie Mayer, Survey of Case Law
Establishing Constitutional Minimums for the Provision of Mental Health Services to Psychiatrically
Involved Inmates, 15 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 243 (1989). See also B. James
George, The American Bar Association's Mental Health Standards:An Overview, 53 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 338, 342, 371-74 (1985); Elyce H. Zenoff, Controllingthe Dangers of Dangerousness:The ABA
Standardsand Beyond, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 562, 568 (1985). See generallyJames W. Ellis & Ruth
A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded CriminalDefendants, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 414 (1985).
39. Mental disabilities may constitute a basis for innocence claims, as well as provide potentially
mitigating circumstances for sentencing purposes. In capital cases, insanity claims tie directly to
prospects of execution. Claims of mental disability also might be raised in an effort to qualify for
transfer or other accommodations. See Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Inmates with Mental Disorders:A
Guide to Law and Practice, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 339, 344 (1992) (citing
Chambers v. Ingram, 858 F.2d 351, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1988) (involving inmate who faked mental illness;
subsequent care and treatment led to severely negative side effects and charges of malpractice)). The
incentives to feign mental disability include seeking relocation within the prison system or other
advantages. Cohen and Dvoskin distinguished this strategy from the non-advantageous posture of
feigning "bad"-ness. See id. at 346 n.62. Feigning mental illness is arguably somewhat easier than
feigning paralysis or other significant physical disability. See also Sward & Wallace, supra note 11, at
Al (discussing "widespread belief among guards that almost all inmates feign illness").
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to find.' The treatment of mental disabilities differs considerably from that
necessary for physical disabilities 4' and introduces an additional party-the
state hospital-to which prisoners may be sent briefly for treatment or, after the
requisite procedures, transferred for a longer period, pending recovery.42 The
transfer protocol raises issues of due process, while the interplay of civil and
criminal systems complicates an already exacting situation.43 System complexity is accompanied by a potential for system abuse.
A second issue that arises is the often overlooked or misunderstood
distinction between mental illness and mental retardation. Historically, mental
retardation has taken second place to mental illness as a credible topic and
concern.' Moreover, mentally retarded inmates have been treated for mental
illness or simply dismissed as "stupid." Where the distinction is made, it is

40. Because many prison officials lack the time or patience required to address the needs of
mentally ill and retarded individuals, guards often respond to problems concerning these prisoners with
violence. Many states allow corrections officers to use tasers or "stun guns" that fire 45,000-volt darts
for controlling inmates. Thirty prison guards recently used tasers to free hostages at the medical unit
of Virginia's Nottoway Correction Center. See Prison Standoff Ends, Eight Guards Injured, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1996, at A12. Although use of these weapons violates California Department of
Corrections regulations, guards use them anyway. In at least two instances over the past ten years, the
use of tasers resulted in fatalities, as guards repeatedly applied shocks to inmates who refused to leave
their cells. See, e.g., Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Gates v. Gomez, 60
F.3d 525, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1995) (continuation of Gates v. Rowland) (reviewing challenge to district
court's order regarding continued use of 37-millimeter grenade launcher gun on inmates).
41. Moreover, rights to treatment are oriented toward physical disabilities. The deliberateindifference standard, which is tied to ignoring serious medical needs, reduces the potential success of
legal challenges. One definition of "serious medical need" is an injury so conspicuous that a layperson
"would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." See Johnson v. Busby, 953 F.2d 349,
351 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding jury instruction using this language). When discussing cuts, wounds,
abrasions, and major physical injuries, this concept may have some merit. The frequent invisibility of
mental disabilities, however, separates them from visible physical disabilities and becomes an additional
obstacle to successful legal challenges.
42. Transfers raise issues of civil-commitment proceedings, standards of proof, determinations of
dangerousness, and a litany of associated and responsive legal concerns. One primary concern has been
the absence of process and judicial involvement in decisions to transfer inmates from prisons to state
hospitals. A selection of statutory authorizations reflects, however realistically, these concerns for the
process. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 406 (1993) (authorizing Superior Court to inquire into
allegations of prisoner's mental disabilities and to order inmate transferred from prison to state hospital);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.37(4) (West 1993) (authorizing transfer where more appropriate care is available,
subject to approvalof committing court); id. § 51.37(5)(b) (mandating that emergency transfers under
dangerousness clause in this section be accompanied by filing of statement with court within 24 hours).
But see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4412 (West 1993) (authorizing transfer of mentally disabled inmates
to medical facility or back to prison without court approval, albeit subject to procedure for internal
reports on inmate's condition).
43. See Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607, 610-13 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding appellant's rights
violated when he was transferred without judicial hearing); United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410
F.2d 1071, 1073 (2d Cit. 1969) (holding that prisoner must be afforded substantially same procedural
safeguards as are provided in civil commitment proceedings to be transferred to state institution for
insane criminals). But see Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1972) (noting that initial
commitment of sex offender might not require safeguards present in civil-commitment proceeding where
commitment is alternative to incarceration).
44. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 38, at 480-81.
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often to the disadvantage of the mentally retarded individual.45 American
prisons hold a significant population of mentally retarded prison inmates whose
problems are distinct from those of mentally ill inmates and, in many respects,
much more difficult to resolve.46
Finally, prisons are confronted by a third pressure point: a steady increase
in both the numbers of mentally disabled inmates 7 and the frequency of
litigation challenging those inmates' prison conditions.48 Particularly in the
45. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993). The plaintiffs in Doe challenged Kentucky
statutes that gave greater protection to mentally ill individuals than to mentally retarded individuals
during the civil-commitment process. See id. at 2640. The Court justified this distinction by noting that,
unlike mental illness, "[miental retardation is a permanent, relatively static condition... [and] a
determination of dangerousness may be made with some accuracy based on previous behavior." Id. at
2644. Another line of demarcation is the just execution of mentally retarded prisoners versus mentally
ill or insane prisoners. The Supreme Court has ruled that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
to execute an insane person. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986). However, the Court
has not yet indicated that execution of mentally retarded inmates violates the Eighth Amendment. See
Wills v. Texas, 114 S. Ct. 1867, 1867-68 (1994) (recognizing that mental retardation is simply one
mitigating factor that juries may consider in sentencing) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (holding that capital punishment of mentally
retarded individuals is not categorically prohibited by Eighth Amendment); see also infra Section I.C.
(discussing issues concerning disabled death-row inmates).
46. Several problems distinguish mental retardation from mental illness. The former is a constant
condition, not significantly treatable. "Right to treatment" discourse tends not to apply as clearly in
these cases. Moreover, mentally retarded inmates constitute a major part of the discernibly "weak"
prison population, which makes them conspicuous targets for internal violence and abuse. They are
likely to incur the wrath of prison administrators and guards for their limited ability to follow prison
regimen accurately, and more easily than most can become the tools of other inmates. A parallel can
be drawn between the mentally retarded inmate and his or her blind or deaf cellmate, as each is
precluded from understanding, seeing, or hearing essential information, instructions, or events. The
distinction is that blind and deaf inmates may circumnavigate some of the problems with auxiliary aids.
Their vulnerabilities overlap with regard to security; hearing aids notwithstanding, what one cannot see,
hear, or recognize as intending harm may be harmful or dangerous.
For a useful discussion of the problems that mentally retarded individuals confront after conviction,
see Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 38, at 480-81.
47. See Morain, supranote 8, atAl. A 1993 California Corrections Department study reported that
11% of male and 15 % of female prison inmates suffered from severe mental disorders. See id. Lawsuits
have been filed alleging deprivation of adequate mental-health care to more than 28,000 California
inmates. See id. Kyle McKinsey, head of the Corrections Department's health-care unit, placed the
potential costs at $300 million annually, should these cases be lost by the state, with control assumed
by the federal courts. See id. With the 1995 decision in Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1306-10
(E.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that, among other deficiencies, prison officials provided inadequate care to
mentally ill inmates), it remains to be seen if McKinsey's projections will prove accurate.
48. As lawyers search for more effective equations with which to challenge the conditions in which
their clients live, interesting logic formulations should emerge. See Cameron v. Tomes, 990 F.2d 14,
19-20 (1st Cir. 1993). Affirming a district court's grant of injunctive relief to a convicted sex offender
who appealed a post-conviction commitment from one day to life in a special Massachusetts treatment
facility, the court of appeals noted that it based its holding on slightly different grounds:
[C]ontext works in Cameron's favor. While his prison sentence will expire in 2002 or even
earlier, his confinement in the Treatment Center is from one day to life and will never end
unless his condition improves and he is found to be no longer sexually dangerous. Thus,
Cameron's best argumentis thatthe state'sordinaryproceduresand constraintsareaffirmatively
and needlessly worsening his mental condition, so that he may well be confined long after his
sentence has expired. This is a claim with some bite, no matter how much latitude states
ordinarily have to run their institutions.
Id. (emphasis added). The general worsening of conditions while in prison has not been an especially
effective argument within the physical-disability context. Whether it will take on strength when directed
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California correctional system, but generally throughout the nation as well,
corrections facilities have had tremendous difficulty providing appropriate
placement and treatment for mentally disabled inmates. Unfortunately, the
problem can culminate in the mentally disabled inmate being driven to extreme
heights of disorientation or, left unmonitored, to attempting suicide, sometimes
successfully.4 9
3.

HIV- and AIDS-Infected

Inmates with HIV present among the most severe challenges to corrections
administrations today. s They are sick and getting sicker." Protective
legislation means that they cannot be ignored, but their medical needs require
special care at a cost beyond easy calculation. Their presence among
noninfected inmates is controversial and has resulted in violence. 2 Infected
inmates claim both a right to freedom from segregation and a right to
protection against inmate violence. Mainstreaming among the general prison
population, however, renders infected inmates most vulnerable to assaults by
fellow inmates. Uninfected inmates, fearful of the disease and fueled by a
predictable brand of prejudice and hostility, demand that infected prisoners be
segregated. The rights and needs of these various inmate groups conflict,
raising questions of both policy priorities and constitutional due process.
Coverage of HIV infection as a disability under the ADA was prefigured
by earlier case law addressing contagious diseases. In the landmark case of

toward mental disabilities is purely conjectural. Moreover, the effectiveness of the court's theory is
linked to the state's ability to sentence Cameron to a potentially endless term at the facility. In states in
which statutory provisions preclude this option-limiting medical-facility time to the length of original
sentence pending full civil-commitment proceedings-the argument loses potency. Nonetheless, some
formulation might be proposed linking especially poor conditions during prison incarceration to the
enhanced probability of civil commitment following release from prison.
49. See Bill Wallace & Susan Sward, Suicidal Inmates Often Ignored-Until Too Late, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 4, 1994, at Al (reporting episodes of suicidal inmates ignored, overlooked, suspected of
malingering, and even written up for attempts).
50. Federal and state prisons reported holding 22,713 HIV-positive inmates in 1994. Bureau of
Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, HIV in Prisons 1994 (last modified Mar. 19, 1996)
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/pub/bjs/abstract/hivip94.htm>. California state officials project that
anywhere from 1100 to 3100 inmates carry HIV. See Morain, supra note 8, at Al.
51. HIV-infected inmates either have full-scale AIDS, Aids Related Complex (ARC) or
Asymptomatic HIV infection. The disparity of symptoms and state of inmates' health among these three
further complicates decisions regarding placement within the prison community.
52. See, e.g., Adams v. Drew, 906 F. Supp. 1050, 1052 (E.D. Va. 1995) (recounting how group
of inmates attacked another inmate after learning that he had AIDS). The victim in Drew asked
correctional officers to move him from his cell block because he believed other inmates would attack
him. See id. Prisoners known to carry HIV live under constant apprehension of harm. See Anderson
v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 526 (7th Cir. 1995); Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1524 (9th Cir. 1993)
("[W]henever inmates discover another inmate is HIV-positive ... threats are made against that
inmate's life. According to [the Chief of Security at the Central Unit in the Florence facility], an HIVpositive inmate whose seropositive status is discovered by the general inmate population would be in
a life threatening situation."), rev'd and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996).
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School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,53 the Supreme Court decided that
a teacher infected with tuberculosis stated a claim for disability-based
discrimination when she was dismissed because she had a contagious
disease.54 Subsequent cases under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 confirmed
that the same theory applied to AIDS. In Harris v. Thigpen," for example,
while reviewing a challenge to the treatment of HIV-positive inmates in the
Alabama correctional system, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that individuals testing positive for HIV qualified as
"handicapped individuals" under the Rehabilitation Act standard.56 At the
same time, courts generally have agreed that concerns for security and medical
57
integrity justify the segregation and disparate treatment of inmates with HIV.
Accommodation of HIV-infected prisoners creates a range of issues,
including mainstreaming, protection from physical violence and institutional
staff prejudice, and providing for their extensive medical needs. These needs
regularly clash with the peculiar threat that HIV and AIDS present in a prison
setting. Sexual assault is commonplace among inmates, and with HIV infections
already thriving, the potential for transmission of the disease is considerable.
The conflict centers on the struggle between equal protection versus special
needs, and on prisoners' rights versus deference to prison authorities.

53. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
54. See id.
55. 941 F.2d 1495 (1lth Cir. 1991).
56. See id. at 1522-24. There was opposition to including HIV infections under the disability
coverage provided by ADA. See Conferees Clear Disability Rights Bill After Deleting House AIDS
Amendment, DAILY REP. FOR EXECuTIvES, June 26, 1990, at A-12 (discussing defeat of proposed
Chapman Amendment to ADA, which would have allowed transfer of HIV-infected food service
workers based on their disability).
57. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 136 (1977) ("There
is nothing in the Constitution which requires prison officials to treat all inmate groups alike where
differentiation is necessary to avoid an imminent threat of institutional disruption or violence."); Gates
v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1448 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing district court's order requiring that
defendants permit HIV-infected inmates to work in food service operations); Roe v. Fauver, CIV. A.
No. 88-1225 (AET), 1988 WL 106316 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 1988) (holding that confinement to hospital
room was not likely to raise successful Eighth Amendment claim); see also Ayesha Khan, The
Application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to the Segregation of HPV-Positive Inmates, 65
WASH. L. REV. 839, 848-49 (1990). As of 1990, states were employing a variety of strategies in
housing HIV-infected inmates. Some jurisdictions screen on a case-by-case basis, while others mandate
location on a categorical delineation (AIDS, ARC, or asymptomatic). Certain jurisdictions turned to
special programming, including either single cells for infected inmates, or assignment of two infected
inmates as cellmates, as well as tailored work assignments. The focus is on mainstreaming infected
inmates while reducing the dangers of disease transmission. Texas, along with a few other jurisdictions,
.permanently segregate[s] all three categories of HIV-infected inmates." Id. at 849. California had tried
the complete segregation strategy, but eventually signed a consent agreement (encompassing many other
complaints) that included a plan to review and amend this policy. See id. at 849 n.58. For more
discussion on asymptomatic HIV-positive inmates, see Dean v. Knowles, 912 F. Supp. 519, 522 (S.D.
Fla. 1996) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that he was denied
access to trustee program due to his HIV-positive status).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's recent holding
in Gates v. Rowland 8 suggests that some courts will elevate the penological
interests of security and efficiency above the statutory rights of HIV-infected
inmates. Among the most interesting aspects of the Gates decision was the
court's willingness to consider the irrational fears of guards or other inmates
as legitimate interests. 59 Traditional antidiscrimination policy does not permit
accommodation of prejudice and ungrounded fear; in a prison setting, however,
with heightened security concerns and an intensely volatile population, the
Gates court felt that such circumstances warranted recognition.
4.

Hearing Impaired

Deaf inmate claims comprise a considerable percentage of prison disability
cases. 6° These inmates encounter a uniquely problem-ridden path just getting
into prison, 6' experience an uncommon type and degree of disadvantage in
prison due to their disability,62 and present a discrete set of challenges to

58. 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
59. See id. at 1447-48 ("[M]any members of the general prison population are not necessarily
motivated by rational thought and frequently have irrational suspicions or phobias that education will
not modify."). The court found that excluding HIV-positive inmates from food service jobs served
legitimate custodial security concerns because prisoners are particularly sensitive to food service and will
perceive a health risk despite scientific pronouncements. See id. at 1447. For a general discussion of
Gates' ramifications, see infra text accompanying notes 273-275.
60. Tugg v. Towey, 864 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D. Fla. 1994), provides an example of the difficulties

deaf and hearing-impaired inmates face during incarceration. In Tugg, the court reviewed claims that
"equivalent mental health services could only be provided by counselors, deaf or hearing, with sign
language ability, who have a sufficient knowledge and understanding of the deaf community." Id. at
1204. Responding to defendants' claim that the legislation excludes culture from qualifying impairments
(citing Department of Justice commentary on ADA), the court determined that
[t]he Plaintiffs established that the interpreters offered by the Defendants fail to surmount the
language barrier the Plaintiffs face in receiving effective mental health counseling. To the extent
that this obstacle is heightened by a therapist's lack of education, training or experience
regarding the specific psychological conditions common to the deaf, the Court finds this issue
is rooted in the Plaintiffs' condition, not their culture.
Id. at 1208. For an extensive discussion of the problems confronted by deaf inmates, see Bonnie P.
Tucker, Deaf Prison Inmates: ime To Be Heard, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1 (1988), reprinted in 2
PRISONERS AND THE LAW

61.

ch. 17B (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1996).

See Lennard J. Davis, The Prisonersof Silence, NATION, Oct. 4, 1993, at 354. A profoundly

deaf defendant, awaiting trial in New Jersey (for 14 months when the article was published), was unable
to read, write, or use sign language. Statutory options included a designation of mental incompetence,
which required commitment to a mental hospital until the defendant acquired language skills, or a
designation as competent, which required him to stand trial without any understanding of the significance
of the process. Teaching these defendants enough sign language to communicate effectively is
exceptionally difficult and prohibitively expensive-in the neighborhood of $70,000 per year to provide
individualized cell-based training. The larger problem is that linguistic incompetence is not generally
recognized in the American criminal justice system; this requires case-by-case challenges and treatment.
62. See Clarkson v. Coughlin, 783 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Clarkson's experience at Bedford Hills can be described best as "a prison within a prison."..
Rarely was she fully aware of what was going on around her. The record indicates, for
example, that Clarkson underwent HIV testing without her knowledge and that she received and
took medicine without knowing why. Her ability to participate in educational training programs
was limited; she could not take advantage of group counseling; and she did not enjoy the same
telephone and television privileges as did inmates who are not hearing-impaired.
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prison management attempting to solve problems or simply to comply with
legislative mandates.
Deaf or hearing-impaired inmates have distinct problems adjusting to prison
regimens. Their disability is not immediately observable, yet their lack of
access to events surrounding them parallels that of the wheelchair-bound
paraplegic.63 Guards do not see their deafness, but do see their failure to
respond to commands. Fellow inmates do not understand their incomprehension, but notice their seeming lack of intelligence or their inherent vulnerability
to assault or abuse. Deaf inmates cannot hear announcements, nor the footsteps
of an impending attack. They are often poorly educated, if at all, and may lack
sufficient skills in American Sign Language.' Because they typically cannot
manage their own interactions with prison staff, they are dependent on fellow
inmates or guards to interpret for them in situations ranging from casual
encounters to disciplinary hearings. There is little way of ensuring that the
translation is neither errant nor deliberately sabotaged.
Title IV of the ADA, which pertains to telecommunications, holds
particular promise for hearing-impaired inmates. It mandates the equitable
provision of auxiliary devices such as TDDs. In conjunction with Title II's
general requirements, Title IV also requires adequate alternatives for receiving
announcements, warnings, and official communications. Even the remedies
carry problems, however, as these alternative devices implicate both privacy
and equal protection issues.'

Id. at 793; see also Niece v. Fitzner, 922 F. Supp. 1208 (E.D. Mich. 1996). Inmate Niece was not
allowed access to TDD telephones to communicate with his deaf fiancee. See id. at 1212; see also infra
note 65 (defining TDDs). He brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (1994), which protects a person
from discrimination based on his "known association with a disabled person." Id. at 1216. His fiancee
actually went so far as to purchase a text telephone system and donate it to the prison so that Niece
would be able to contact her. The prison still refused to allow him to use the device. See id. at 1212.
See generally Rewolinski v. Morgan, 896 F. Supp. 879, 881 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (discussing other
problems suffered by deaf inmates).
63. See, e.g., Large v. Washington County Detention Ctr., No. 90-6610, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS
18239, at *4 (4th Cir. Oct. 16, 1990) ("We hold only that under appropriate circumstances the refusal
to supply a hearing aid to a convict could constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need,
hence a violation of the eighth amendment rights.").
64. Controversy exists within the deaf community in America regarding how deaf individuals
should be educated. American Sign Language (ASL) has become the traditional form of communication,
emphasizing interaction among persons skilled in this language form. It warrants attention, however,
that alternative methods of language acquisition like Cued Speech, a phonemically based method, are
gaining ground and achieving noteworthy results in educational settings.
In any event, many hearing-impaired inmates have little or no formal education, training in ASL,
or skills interacting successfully with non-ASL individuals. This characteristic leaves them singularly
ill-equipped even to make the best of an admittedly bad situation. Some efforts are being made to
provide ASL training in prison settings. In Tugg, however, a mental-health counselor testified that "[[it
takes five years to be fluent in ASL. There is no written component for it. It has its own rules and
instructions." 864 F. Supp. at 1207. For a discussion of projected costs of educating inmates or
defendants in ASL, see supra note 61.
65. TDDs are text telephones that enable a visual circumnavigation of the hearing impairment.
66. Use of TDD equipment, for example, places the privacy and confidentiality of conversation in
jeopardy. See Michael F. Kelleher, The Confidentiality of Criminal Conversations on TDD Relay
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Disabled PretrialDetainees

This Article focuses on conditions of confinement for convicted prisoners,
but the ADA's provisions also affect pretrial detainees. Bell v.

Wolfish, 67

the

leading case on the rights of pretrial detainees, suggests that there is little
practical difference between pretrial detention and post-conviction incarceration
insofar as rights to reasonable treatment are concerned.68 Pretrial detainees do
not have any special protection against unpleasant or even painful detention
conditions. Noting that the presumption of innocence "has no application to a
determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his
trial has even begun," 69 the Supreme Court in Wolfish concentrated on
whether the conditions constituted punishment.7" This determination appears
to turn on intent, rather than effect, but the standard for analysis is unclear.7
The standard employed tends to resemble the deliberate indifference standard
applied to convicted prisoners.72
Although not yet convicted of any offense, pretrial detainees encounter
antagonism toward perceived "criminal elements" similar to that which
confronts convicted prisoners. This absence of demarcation, in tandem with
recent judicial holdings, suggests that ADA claims are unlikely to conclude
differently for pretrial detainees,73 unless the plaintiff can effectively
Systems, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1349 (1991); Stephanie Hoit Lee, Wisconsin v. Rewolinski: Do Members
of the Deaf Community Have a Right To Be Free From Search and Seizure of Their TDD Calls?, 10
LAW & INEQ. J. 187 (1992); Stuart N. Brotman, SafeguardingConfidences, NAT'L L.J., July 8, 1991,
at 13.
67. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
68. See id. at 533-39. See generally Ira P. Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the FederalCourts:The
Future of FederalJudicialIntervention in Prison Administration, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211
(1980) (discussing Wolfish and its implications).
69. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 533.
70. See id. at 534.
71. See id. at 538-39.
72. See, e.g., Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1993).
Although this court has suggested that a more stringent standard than deliberate indifference
would be appropriate in assessing pretrial detainees' claims of inadequate medical care, no
standard has been clearly established .... In the absence of a clearly established standard for
pretrial detainees' claims of inadequate medical care in the Eighth Circuit, we apply the
deliberate indifference standard in the analysis of this case.
Id. at 152-53 (citation omitted). For a valuable discussion of standards used to evaluate complaints
brought by pretrial detainees, see Telfair v. Gilberg, Civ. A. No. 493-310, 1994 WL 653518 (S.D. Ga.
Oct. 24, 1994).
73. An example of failure to distinguish between pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners is in
Gorman v. Bishop, 919 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Mo. 1996). The plaintiff in this case is a paraplegic who
was arrested after he "solicited assistance from two police officers." Id. at 327. The police van used to
transport Mr. Gorman to the police station was not equipped with a wheelchair lift or wheelchair
restraints. Thus, the officers "lifted Plaintiff from his wheelchair and placed him on a wooden bench
inside the van. Plaintiffs physical condition prevented him from supporting himself on the bench, so
[they] used Plaintiffs belt to tie his upper body to the wire mesh wall behind the bench." Id. Gorman
fell at some point during the trip and suffered injuries to his back and shoulders. Surprisingly, the court
dismissed Gorman's ADA claim, relying on the Fourth Circuit's decision inTorcasio v. Murray, 57
F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995). A person who has been arrested
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distinguish the state's interest in pretrial and post-conviction detention for his
or her particular claim.
C.

DisabledDeath-Row Inmates

The execution of Charles Sylvester Stamper in 1994 illustrates several
issues raised by the introduction of nondiscriminatory legislation into the
criminal justice system. Stamper, a Virginia death-row prisoner, was the
subject of passionate debate regarding the execution of severely disabled
prisoners who may pose little further threat to society.74 On one side were
those who argued that it is inherently inhumane to support executions in these
cases." On the other side were a coalition of prosecutors, victims' rights
advocates, and even an activist for the rights of the disabled.76
Adding to the population of disabled offenders sentenced to death are aging
death-row inmates and those who become disabled after incarceration. Due to
the interplay of legislative requirements and time delays between sentencing
and execution, the state may find itself partially rehabilitating or improving the
condition of these physically disabled inmates prior to execution. The grim
irony of this cycle colors the capital punishment debate. Stamper, unable to
walk to the electric chair even with his walker and braces, was carried to the
death chamber by three corrections officers. He was the first wheelchair-bound
inmate executed since 1959.
The execution of mentally retarded inmates raises especially disturbing
considerations. The Supreme Court has not ruled that such executions violate
Eighth Amendment guarantees." While mental retardation can be used as a
mitigating factor in determining whether to recommend a death sentence, 78 the
mentally retarded defendant is frequently misunderstood by jurors and judges
and becomes an easy target for zealous prosecutors,79 particularly when
represented by mediocre (at best) defense counsel.

is not normally thought of as one who would have occasion 'to meeto the essential eligibility
requirements' for receipt of or participation in the services, programs or activities of a public
entity. The terms 'eligible' and 'participate' imply voluntariness on the part of the applicant
who seeks a benefit from the state; they do not bring to mind [criminal suspects] who are
being held against their will.
Gorman, 919 F. Supp. at 329 (quoting Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1347) (alteration and quotations in original).
The court then held that the ADA's terms did not apply to Gorman's arrest, see id., and that the police
officers "could not have been expected to know that the ADA applied in this situation." Id. at 331
(emphasis added).
74. See Bill Miller, The Execution of a Disabled Killer Rekindles the Debate on Capital
Punishment, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1994, at A10.
75. Not surprisingly, these tend to be representatives from groups that also are generally opposed
to capital punishment.
76. See Miller, supra note 74.
77. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
78. See supra note 45.
79. See John R. Woodward, Disability & Death Row, DISABiLITY RAG & RESOURCE, Nov.-Dec.
1994, at 14, 17.
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STATUS OF DISABLED PRISONERS PRIOR TO THE

ADA

The national commitment to civil rights emerges from the crossfire of social
theory and economic self-esteem. As a nation, we experience sporadic bouts
of noble concern for bettering the lot of our fellow travelers. As an interdependent collective, however, we also retreat from these fits of optimism,
bemoaning excessive costs and the impracticality of change. In especially dark
episodes, those who might otherwise become the recipients of our sharing
tendencies instead serve as the marginalized objects of our scorn and our fear.
Society is especially likely to push aside the health and welfare of prison
inmates. Although prisoners are a segment of society highly susceptible to
abuse by others, they are not a constituency that garners much sympathy.
Perhaps more than any other "minority," prisoners cannot fight back against
discrimination. While they are greatly in need of protection, courts seem
hesitant to apply present statutory frameworks to disabled prisoners.
Historically, the language of civil rights legislation in this country has
focused on increased access, enhanced opportunity, and improved prospects for
all Americans. By contrast, the tone of prisoner litigation has been cautious at
best, and typically discouraging. When the tenets of antidiscrimination policy
meet the constraints of alleged penological necessity, the result is confusion and
contradictory judicial analysis, accompanied by decreased prospects for success
in the courts.
Nevertheless, the progress of civil rights litigation has not entirely escaped
prisons. As the nation committed itself to protection of equal rights regardless
of race, religion, and gender, the courts challenged social institutions and
included prisons in the process. Lawsuits confronting prisons alleged racial
segregation and denial of religious freedom among other claims." ° The courts,
while deferential to the unique circumstances inherent to the prison context,"'
80. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (upholding rights of Buddhist inmate to
exercise his religious rights to degree comparable to that afforded other inmates); Lee v. Washington,
390 U.S. 333, 333 (1968) (holding that state statutes mandating segregation of races within prison and
jail populations violated Fourteenth Amendment, even weighed against competing interests of security
and administrative efficiency); Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[A] generalized
or vague fear of racial violence is not a sufficient justification for a broad policy of racial segregation.").
81. Much literature addresses the judiciary's "hands off" doctrine, which essentially held that courts
were ill-equipped to oversee prison management, and the peculiar requirements of prisons exempted
those facilities from the usual degree of judicial scrutiny. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404
(1974) (noting traditional hands-off doctrine). The doctrine began to lose strength during the Warren
Court era, as civil rights concerns permeated American society and the American legal system. Courts
began to articulate the theory that fundamental constitutional rights are not checked at the prison door.
See Henry v. Van Cleve, 469 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that district court erred in dismissing
state prison inmate's claim of racially discriminatory treatment by prison staff under blanket theory of
deference to prison management); see also Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966) (holding
that district court erred in dismissing claim by black inmate regarding denial of access to publications
granted to white inmates). In recent years, with the conservative Burger and Rehnquist Courts, judicial
intervention has slowed, and this trend seems likely to continue. Indeed, we may well "be headed
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still cooperated by acknowledging that a limited core of civil rights survived
incarceration.82 The identified core, however, remained susceptible to
defenses of security considerations and administrative necessity on the part of
prison administrators.
The civil rights policies of the 1960s and 1970s contained a vision of
fundamental, inviolable freedoms for each individual. That these rights would
travel with the person, even into prison settings, was not beyond imagination.
By contrast, the disabled individuals' movement originated in debates over
economic empowerment and employment prospects, long before antidiscrimination policy in this area seized the higher moral ground of fundamental rights. Delayed articulation in these terms, as well as a continuing
perception that disabled persons' rights were a matter of improved employment
opportunities, combined to obscure the application of nondiscriminatory
practices. Disabled prisoners framed their allegations in Eighth Amendment
"cruel and unusual punishment" terms, rather than as direct claims of
discrimination.
A.

Constitutional Standardsfor PrisonLitigation

Prior to the passage of either the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the
Americans with Disabilities Act, courts heard a series of lawsuits brought by
physically and mentally disabled prisoners. Inmates alleged violations of their
constitutional rights by filing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.8 3 The Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment" provided the
standard for determining the merits of these claims. Claims cited inadequate or
inappropriate medical treatment, lack of access to exercise facilities, and lack

toward a new hands-off doctrine in correctional law." Ira P. Robbins, The Prisoners'Mail Box andthe
Evolution of FederalInmate Rights, 144 F.R.D. 127, 169 (1993).
82. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 546 (1974) (noting that concerns for security and
effective prison management counterbalance unfettered exercise of prisoners' rights). In Wolff, the Court
articulated the potential applicability of both the Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment
to prisoners' claims. In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), however, the Court curtailed an
expansive reading of the Wo/ffdecision. See id. at 224. The Court has been cautious in the cases that
followed; essentially, prisoners are deemed to retain some constitutional rights following conviction and
incarceration, but the Court has hesitated to identify the extent to which particular rights withstand
challenge by alleged competing state interests. See Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2206-07 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory ... subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
84. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
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of access to vocational or rehabilitative programs, as well as appalling
conditions within the prison confines.
The cruel and unusual punishment standard proved to be exceptionally
difficult to meet. In case after case, plaintiffs established that their medical
needs had not been met and that prison life for severely disabled prisoners was
painful, humiliating, damaging to their health, and effectively constituted an
additional punishment of a most severe order. More often than not, however,
the courts found that conditions did not constitute a violation of Eighth
Amendment dimensions.
In Estelle v. Gamble, 5 the Supreme Court affirmed the 'government's
obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by
incarceration."86 Setting the high standard that would tilt prison conditions
litigation to the side of the state for the next several decades, the Court
concluded:
[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" ... proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors
in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally
denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the
treatment once prescribed. Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to
a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983. 7

As became evident even within the Estelle opinion, deliberate indifference
was a strict test to meet."t The maltreatment or failure to treat must be both

85. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
86. Id. at 103.
87. Id. at 104-05 (citation omitted); see also Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1457 (6th Cir. 1993)
("[N]o physical injury is required for a prisoner to recover on an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate
indifference to medical needs. Extreme conduct by custodians that causes severe emotional distress is
sufficient.") (citation omitted); Brown v. Hill, No. Civ. A. 93-6424, 1994 WL 570880, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 17, 1994).
88. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105 (observing that second electrocution attempt after initial
malfunction was not unconstitutional) (citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459
(1947)). Further, "an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care" would not implicate "cruel
and unusual" prohibitions. Id.; see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) ("If the pain
inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental
element must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify.").

The Americans with Disabilities Act in Prison
intentional89 and of such a degree that it "can offend evolving standards of
decency."' Few litigants were able to establish deliberate indifference.9"
As the deliberate-indifference standard reigned in medical and health-related
litigation, other questions dominated claims alleging violation of "liberty
interests. "9 Courts reviewed claims regarding security ratings within prisons,93 double-bunking, 9 freedom from transfer even to a distant prison in
another state, 95 the right to parole, 96 the right to rehabilitation,' the right

89. The requirement of intent has continued throughout Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
However, Justice Stevens, dissenting in Estelle, argued:
If this is meant to indicate that intent is a necessary part of an Eighth Amendment violation, I
disagree. If a State elects to impose imprisonment as a punishment for crime, I believe it has
an obligation to provide the persons in its custody with a health care system that meets minimal
standards of adequacy. As a part of that basic obligation, the State and its agents have an
affirmative duty to provide reasonable access to medical care, to provide competent, diligent
medical personnel, and to ensure that prescribed care is in fact delivered. For denial of medical
care is surely not part of the punishment which civilized nations may impose for crime.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 116 n. 13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 106 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Some claimants prevailed, notwithstanding the steep burden of proof. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Hardin County, 908 F.2d 1280, 1284 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Where there is credible testimony that a prisoner
was denied prescribed pain relief medication, denied access to shower facilities, denied crutches, and
denied needed bedding in spite of his repeated requests and complaints made personally to the
defendants, we believe a jury could reasonably conclude [that the defendants' behavior amounted to
deliberate indifference]."); Large v. Washington County Detention Ctr., No. 90-6610, 1990 WL
153978, at *22 (4th Cir. Oct. 16, 1990) (noting that "there is ample authority recognizing that the
failure to provide comparable basic corrective/medical devices may amount to deliberate indifference");
LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 394 (4th Cir. 1987) (arguing failure to provide proper toilet facility and
physical therapy to paraplegic inmate constituted deliberate indifference); Cummings v. Roberts, 628
F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding denial of access to wheelchair for three days stated claim of
cruel and unusual punishment); Yarbaugh v. Roach, 736 F. Supp. 318, 319 (D.D.C. 1990) (requiring
prison officials to provide medical care to inmate suffering from multiple sclerosis).
92. Liberty-interest determinations merit a separate article. Prior to Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct.
2293 (1995), liberty interests arose either from sources of fundamental rights, such as the Constitution,
or from plainly stated mandatory statutory language. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
Generally, prisoner litigation alleging a violation of liberty interests more often seemed to turn on
whether the alleged liberty interest existed than whether it had been violated. See, e.g., Reed v. Lewis,
No. 90-15586, 1990 WL 186829, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 1990) ("A state may create a constitutionally
protected liberty interest by establishing regulatory measures that impose substantive limitations on the
exercise of official discretion.") (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1983)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 942 (10th Cir. 1982) ("A person
involuntarily confined by the state to an institution retains liberty interests that are protected by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment ....
Such person has the right to reasonably safe conditions
of confinement, the right to be free from unreasonable bodily restraints . . . .") (citations omitted).
93. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976) (holding that conviction sufficiently
extinguished defendant's liberty interest to empower state to transfer defendant from medium- to
maximum-security prison); Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 1994) ("The federal constitution
itself vests no liberty interest in inmates in retaining or receiving any particular security or custody
status.").
94. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) ("To the extent that such conditions
are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society."); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979) ("We disagree ... that there is some sort
of 'one man, one cell' principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.").
95. See, e.g., Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224-25; Stewart v. Davies, 954 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1992).
96. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
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to work within the prison,9" and many others. Consistently, the courts found
that prisoners do not hold many liberty interests;" given the Supreme Court's
new "atypical and significant hardship" standard, this trend is likely to continue."'° Meanwhile, the areas of prisoners' rights and medical/health conditions
merged through claims involving the right to treatment,' 0 ' the right to be free
from nonconsensual treatment, and even the right to refuse life-saving treatment. 102
Within this setting, disabled prisoners complained about egregious
conditions of confinement in addition to denial of adequate or equal access to
prison resources and facilities. Their claims were bolstered by their disabilities,
but not to an exceptional degree. Instead, the disability was simply a factor for
judicial consideration. In balancing the merits of the prisoner's rights versus
the state's correctional needs, courts viewed the plaintiff as a prisoner who
happened to have a disability, rather than as a disabled prisoner. 103

97. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995); see also Stewart, 954 F.2d at 516
(concluding that inmate had no due process right to or liberty interest in participation in rehabilitative
programs or in possibility of parole); Reed v. Lewis, No. 90-15586, 1990 WL 186829, at *1 (9th Cir.
Nov. 29, 1990) (holding that prisoner "does not have a general constitutional right to rehabilitation").
98. See Reed, 1990 WL 186829, at *1.
99. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300. In Sandin, the Court recognized that states may create due
process liberty interests in certain circumstances. See id. "But these interests will be generally limited
to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to
give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . nonetheless imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. For an
illustration of the Court's previous analysis of liberty interests, see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
315 (1982) (finding historic liberty interest protected by due process that survives conviction and
incarceration); see also Reed, 1990 WL 186829, at *1 ("A protected liberty interest may be created by
state statutes, administrative regulations, or published prison policy rules and regulations.") (citing
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1983)).
100. For a discussion of the "atypical and significant hardship" standard, see supra note 99. The
Ninth Circuit decision in Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994), addressed statutory rights,
concluding that prisoners are subject to the four-part test of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). This
was tied to the absence of express congressional intent to introduce these rights into prisons. See id. The
reconciliation of the Reed/Hewitt thread and the Gates restriction may turn on the presence of explicit
statutory text indicating legislative intent that the statute apply to prisoners.
101. See 1 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS ch. 3 (2d ed. 1993).
102. The prisoner's right to refuse treatment emerged as an articulation of the prisoner's right, even
though incarcerated, to control certain fundamental decisions about his or her own life. The demand that
prisons provide decent and comprehensive treatment, however, presumes a situation in which the inmate
may choose to refuse. And the right-to-refuse decision complicates the presumption that medical care
is absolutely mandated. See Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 388 (Cal. 1993) (holding that state
may not force prisoner to accept unwanted treatment or care).
103. The distinction may seem unclear. With the arrival of Rehabilitation Act and ADA cases,
however, disabled prisoners at least achieved an acknowledgment for a type of class standing. It would
be optimistic to conclude that this in turn takes them very far; but there is a discernible shift in
perspective with the addition of the disability legislation.
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B.

Statutory Civil Rights for the Disabled: The Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Prior to 1973, national disability-related legislation focused almost entirely
on vocational rehabilitation and employment issues." ° Attempts to pass civil
rights legislation on behalf of disabled Americans were unsuccessful, quashed
by an increasingly conservative backlash against the civil rights movement of
the preceding decades as well as concern over the economic impact of
employment mandates. A series of Vocational Rehabilitation Acts"°5 provided
for training and physical rehabilitation. Concern for the rights and dignity of
disabled Americans was articulated not in terms of civil rights, but in terms of
the economic benefits the nation would gain from providing improved
employment opportunities to the disabled."m The legislative discussion
addressed the benefits of employment-based self-sufficiency to disabled persons
and to the nation as a whole. The disabled would regain pride and self-esteem,
while the country would be relieved of a tremendous drain on national
resources. 107
In 1973, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act.' The Act provided not
only for rehabilitation and job training, but also went a significant step further
by demanding that both the federal government and programs receiving federal
funding cease discriminatory practices toward disabled persons. Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act provided: "No otherwise qualified individual with
handicaps in the United States

. .

. shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be

excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 9 This section was not the cornerstone of the Act, since the text
was surrounded by the traditional discourse of economic imperatives." 0
Nevertheless, an unbroken pattern of economic argument was finally
interrupted by legislation that included an acknowledgment of social policy
preferences and the civil rights of disabled individuals.
Through its new civil rights component, the Rehabilitation Act began to
change the landscape of disabled-prisoner litigation, primarily by lending some
104. See Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of
FederalLegislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1364

(1993).
105. See id. at 1364-70.
106. See id. at 1368, 1397.
107. While it is true that congressional legislation is often cloaked in economic justification so as
to invoke the authority of the Commerce Clause, there seems to have been little discourse beyond
consideration of economic issues. This may be the rare case in which legislation citing the Commerce
Clause as its basis for authority is actually just what it claims to be.
108. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994)).
109. Id. § 794.
110. The current text of 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994) reads: "The purposes of this chapter are: (1) to
empower individuals with disabilities to maximize employment, economic self-sufficiency, independence,
and inclusion and integration into society. ... " Id.
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credibility to inmate claims. Rehabilitation Act claims were both grafted onto
§ 1983 constitutional violation claims and used as the sole legal basis for
litigation. In Bonner v. Lewis,"' for example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit discussed the applicability of section 504 to
prisoners."' Accepting the petitioner's argument that receipt of federal funds
was the standard for application of the Rehabilitation Act and that the
vocational aims of the Act did have application to prisoners, the court
determined that the claim was cognizable under section 504. In Casey v.
Lewis,1 3 a federal district court established the standard that must be met to
succeed on a Rehabilitation Act claim. 1 4 Plaintiffs had to show that they
were: (1) "handicapped persons" under the Rehabilitation Act;" 5 (2) "otherwise qualified";" 6 and that (3) the program at issue was federally funded.
The original Rehabilitation Act was promptly amended and underwent regular
adjustments, changes, and annual reauthorization. Throughout the next two
decades, however, the fundamental mandate of the Act remained unaltered. At
the same time, other disability legislation was winding its way through
Congress, bolstering the gradual national acknowledgment of the need for civil
rights legislation for disabled individuals. This evolution would culminate in
the Americans with Disabilities Act, which would provide the greatest hope for
disabled prisoners.

111. 857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988) (challenging inadequate provision of auxiliary aids and
insufficient access to prison facilities to deaf inmate).
112. See id. at 562-63. The judicial dialogue continues in an inconsistent vein. See, e.g., Gates v.
Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1445 (9th Cir. .1994) ('The Act was not designed to deal specifically with the
prison environment; it was intended for general societal application. There is no indication that Congress
intended the Act to apply to prison facilities."); Scudder v. Smith, No. 92-4127, 1993 WL 262514, at
*1 (6th Cir. July 8, 1993) ("The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 .. . does not apply to involuntary
incarceration."); Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991) ("The section of the
Rehabilitation Act cited by plaintiff ... does not give plaintiff any substantive rights since the Federal
Bureau of Prisons does not fit the definition of 'programs or activities' governed by that section.");
Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1569, 1584 (D. Ariz. 1993) ("Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
applies to inmates' access to prison activities, such as disciplinary proceedings and counseling.") (citing
Bonner, 857 F.2d at 562), vacated and rev'd in partand remanded, 4 F.3d 1516 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd
and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996); Donnell v.Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 829 F. Supp. 1016, 1020
(N.D. 111.
1993) ("Contrary to defendants' assertion, the Act is applicable to inmates at correctional
facilities.") (citing Bonner, 857 F.2d at 562); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (N.D. W.
Va. 1976) (holding that section 504 of Rehabilitation Act is applicable to state prisoner with "a record
of mental impairment" where state Department of Corrections "is a recipient of federal financial
assistance").
113. 834 F. Supp. 1569.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 1584 (citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1992)).
116. See id. (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) ("one
who is able to meet all of the program's requirements in spite of his handicap")).
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III.

A.

THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES

ACT

Background: The Interrelationshipof the RehabilitationAct of 1973 and
the ADA

The ADA invoked a popular American cultural commitment to individual
freedom-unhindered mobility, unlimited participation, and unconstrained
access to all that the modem world offers. The rhetoric of the ADA spoke of
liberation from the impediments of handicaps and social prejudice." 7 The
legislative debate highlighted the economic benefits that would surely
ensue."' Presuming that a free and mobilized American is a profitable, selfsupporting citizen, Congress bolstered its civil libertarian arguments with sheer
financial incentive. 119
On July 26, 1990, President George Bush's signature completed passage of
the ADA,' 20 placing disabilities squarely within the arena of protected civil
rights.' 2' The directives of the ADA deliberately echo those of the 1973
Rehabilitation Act. The ADA not only mandates practices similar to those
required by the Rehabilitation Act, however; it also imposes these requirements
on employers and state and local governments, private entities providing certain
services, providers of public accommodations, local governments, and other
public and private entities. The differences beiween the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act arise in application and presentation. The 1973 law targeted
recipients of federal funding. Consequently, state facilities that received
significant federal money could fall under the Rehabilitation Act's authority.
The issue of funding, however, proved an obstacle in litigation, as petitioners
117. "[D]iscrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as
employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation,
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3)
(1994). "[The Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals
... [because] the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies
people with disabilities ... those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous." Id.
§ 12101(a)(8)-(9).
118. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh maintained that "the mainstreaming of persons with
disabilities will result in more persons with disabilities working, in increased earnings, in less
dependence on the Social Security system for financial support, in increased spending on consumer
goods, and increased tax revenues." STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 101ST
CONG., 1 THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 115 (Comm. Print 1990).
119. Congressional linkage of economic argument and civil rights legislation has a direct precedent
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The purpose of making such a connection, aside from adding incentive,
is to add authority under the Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
120. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994)).
121. See Bush Signs Anti-DiscriminationBillfor the Disabled, S.F. CHRON., July 27, 1990, at A13
("We are keeping faith with the spirit of our courageous forefathers who wrote that. . . 'all men are
created equal.'") (quoting President George Bush).
122. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.103 (1994).
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had to establish both receipt of federal funds and proximity of the funded
program to the program or service alleged to be discriminatory. 2 3 Moreover,
the Rehabilitation Act issued its nondiscrimination mandate in concise
form, 24 for the basic law was simple and nonspecific despite the supporting
documentation, including architectural guidelines and agency rules.
By contrast, the ADA's mandates apply to private employers," z state and
local governments, and private commercial enterprises-without respect to
federal funding. As a result, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are often
viewed as parallel weapons, available respectively within the federal and
state/local realms. The basis for certain ADA claims can also serve as grounds
for a Rehabilitation Act claim where the public entity (thus invoking the ADA)
receives federal funds (thus invoking the Rehabilitation Act). In addition,
where Rehabilitation Act claims against state or local government programs
might be tenuously established with respect to federal funding, they can now
be filed under the ADA."2
Social policy, political expediency, and the need to persuade an entire
nation to accommodate extensive new requirements, combined to present the
ADA as the threshold of a new dawn for all citizens.
Legislative discussions continued to address economic policy issues, but the rhetoric and
justifications for passage finally included fundamental individual justice as a coequal partner to economic. concerns. The ADA was heralded as the cure for
discriminatory evils besetting disabled persons. 218

123. See, e.g., Judd v. Packard, 669 F. Supp. 741, 742-43 (D. Md. 1987) (finding that inmate
failed to demonstrate nexus between alleged discriminatory conduct and specific program receiving
federal funds).
124. See supra Section ll.B.
125. The ADA defines employer-generally-as:
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,
and any agent of such person, except that, for two years following the effective date of this title,
an employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding year, and any agent of such person.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(a) (1994).
126. Even for facilities qualifying under Rehabilitation Act standards (receipt of federal funds), the
extended coverage of ADA will be important. See, e.g., Kunkel v. Pung, Civil No. 4-81-281 (D. Minn.
Aug. 6, 1981) (holding that deaf inmate lost right to sue under Rehabilitation Act for discrimination that
occurred after federal funding that made program subject to Rehabilitation Act was terminated). Under
the ADA, the funding question ceases to be pertinent for state and local government functions.
127. See Robert L. Mullen, The Americans With DisabilitiesAct: An IntroductionForLawyers And
Judges, 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 175, 179 (1994) (citing statements of Senators Harkin and Hatch);
see also Gaylord Shaw, Knocking Down a Barrier; Bush Signs Americans With Disabilities Act,
NEWSDAY, July 27, 1990, at 7 ("This act ... will assure that people with disabilities are given the basic
guarantees for which they have worked so long and so hard-independence, freedom of choice, control
of their own lives, the opportunity to blend fully and equally into the rich mosaic of the American
mainstream.") (quoting President George Bush).
128. See Bush Signs DisabledAnti-Bias Act, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 1990, at 2 ("Every man, woman
and child with a disability can now pass through a once-closed door to a bright new era of equality,
independence and freedom.") (quoting President Bush).
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For prisoners' rights advocates, the ADA presented myriad questions but
precious few answers. Prisoners were not part of the population that Congress
envisioned in passing the ADA. The noble purpose of the ADA was to liberate
law-abiding citizens, not criminals. The rhetoric of freedom seemed odd when
applied to confined inmates; the economic arguments for self-sufficiency
similarly seemed inapplicable to life-term prisoners.
B.

Summary of ADA Requirements

Generally, the ADA mandates the elimination of discriminatory practices
toward disabled persons. 29 The bill opens with a list of findings that suggest
that the disabled are comprehensively disadvantaged within contemporary
American society. 3 ' Although the legislation is divided into distinct sections-each equipped with its own particularized mandate, definitions, and time
frame for implementation-an assumption of general legislative intent applies
1
across all of the sections.13

129. The ADA employs the general definition of "disability" applied under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973: "[Amny person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment," as defined in the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994). Cf
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). The Department of Justice regulations provide further that:
"[Impairment" means any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs (which would include speech organs that are not respiratory such as
vocal cords, soft palate, tongue, etc.); respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular;
reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin and endocrine. It also means
any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities ....
[E]xamples . . . [include]
orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular
dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional
illness, specific learning disabilities, HIV disease (symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis,
drug addiction, and alcoholism.
28 C.F.R. § 35.105 (1994) (Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government
Services).
130. Actually, the text of the findings reads as a conspicuously deliberate echo of the list of indicia
for suspect class status, articulated by the courts. See infra Section V.A (discussing levels of judicial
scrutiny). Equal protection excerpts include:
[l]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with
restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated
to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond
the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative
of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.
Pub. L. No. 101-336, § l(b)(2) (Findings and Purposes). This language is reminiscent of United States
v. Carolene ProductsCo., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (discussing whether prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities is special condition that tends to curtail operation of political processes ordinarily
relied upon to protect minorities and may call for correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry). See
James B. Miller, Note, The Disabled, the ADA and Strict Scrutiny, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 393, 394
(1994).
131. Title II, Subtitle A incorporates definitions and general intent from the other Titles. This is
important, as the actual text within this section is limited in detail. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.103 (1994)
("Title H, however, also incorporates those provisions of titles I and Ill of the ADA that are not
inconsistent with the regulations implementing section 504.") (citing H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
pt. 3, at 51 (1990) and H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., pt. 2, at 84 (1990)).
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and architectural

accommodation, as well as program, facility, and service availability and
access. These categories include everything from wheelchair ramps, to TDD
text-telephone systems, to large-print books for the visually impaired.
Moreover, the ADA encompasses intangible issues of discriminatory policies
and decisionmaking with respect to employment and accommodation of
disabled prisoners. Some ADA requirements are more applicable to prison
inmates than others. Title II of the ADA plays a prominent role in ADA
prisoner litigation, while Titles I, III, IV, and V have only limited applications
for prison inmates.
1.

Title II: Public Services-ProhibitionAgainst Discriminationand
Other Generally Applicable Provisions

Title II of the ADA essentially extends the existing requirements of section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to all state and local governments."'
Title II incorporates the specific prohibitions of discrimination against disabled
persons, which are stated elsewhere in Titles I, III, and V of the ADA. Subtitle
A of Title II, reinforced by Title IV ("Telecommunications"), gives rise to the
bulk of ADA prisoner litigation. As interpreted by Department of Justice
regulations, Title II requires "a public entity to provide each service so that it,
when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals

with disabilities. "133
The concise mandate of Title II states: "No qualified individual 34 with
a disability1 35 shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a

132. See, e.g., Tugg v. Towey, 864 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D. Fla. 1994):
Congress noted that the purpose of Title II of the ADA is to "make applicable to prohibitions
against discrimination on the basis of disability currently set out in regulations implementing
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to all programs, activities and services provided
or made available by state and local governments or instrumentalities or agencies thereto,
regardless of whether or not such entities received federal financial assistance."
Id. at 1205 n.5 (quoting S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong. 44 (1989)).
133. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (1994).
134. See Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1569, 1585 (D. Ariz. 1993) ("The Ninth Circuit has found
that prison inmates within the ADOC, are generally 'qualified (sometimes required) to participate' in
activities such as disciplinary proceedings, Honor Dorm review committee hearings, counseling,
rehabilitation, medical services and other prison activities."), vacated and rev'd in part, 4 F.3d 1516
(9th Cir. 1994), rev'd and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996).
135. Federal regulations define "qualified individual with a disability" as:
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies,
or practices, or the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.
28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1994).

The Americans with Disabilities Act in Prison
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."136 Title
II defines a public entity as:
(a) any State or local government;
(b)any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and
(c) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter
authority
(as defined in section 103(8) of the Rail Passenger Service
137
Act).

Along with architectural requirements for existing and new constructions,
Subtitle A of Title II of the ADA focuses on access to programs and
services.' 38 Subtitle A is exceptionally brief, particularly in comparison to the
rest of the Act.' 39 Much like section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act,
Subtitle A contains little more than a tersely stated requirement of nondiscrimination for those programs and activities that fall under the given parameters.
States are not immune, via Eleventh Amendment guarantees, to litigation under
this Title V of the ADA, and the remedies available in lawsuits against states
are the same as those available in suits against private individuals.
Remedies under Title II are identical to those available under section 505
of the Rehabilitation Act; 4 they consist of a private right of action, injunctive relief, and other damages (generally attorneys' fees with expenses and
costs). The extent of available damages is purely speculative at this time. In
addition, the remedies available under the ADA do not preclude relief available
under other federal or state laws. Significantly for prisoner claims, the courts
may order entities to accommodate plaintiffs by structural alterations, policy
changes, or provision of facilitative equipment."'

136. The general deadline for implementing Tide II was January 26, 1992. See 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.508(a) (1991). Several Subtitle B transportation requirements, however, have extended deadlines
into the late 1990s and even the next century. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.508(c) (1991).
The defense for noncompliance with this section is "undue hardship": an action requiring
"significant difficulty or expense." 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1994).
137. Id.
138. But see Jackson v. Inhabitants of Sanford, Civ. No. 94-12-P-H, 1994 WL 589617, at *6 (D.
Me. Sept. 23, 1994) (discussing legislative concern over effect of disability discrimination in police
interaction with citizens, including "unjustified arrests of disabled persons").
139. Subtitle B of Title II, "Actions Applicable to Public Transportation Provided by Public Entities
Considered Discriminatory," presents an extensive scheme for implementation of nondiscriminatory
practices and provisions in transportation systems. It has little if any application for incarcerated prison
populations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12143 (1994). However, Gorman v. Bishop, 919 F. Supp. 326, 327
(W.D. Mo. 1996), exemplifies the need for Subtitle B. In Gorman, a paraplegic arrestee was injured
when transported in a non-handicap-accessible van. See supra note 73 (discussing Gorman).
140. See42 U.S.C. § 12188 (1994); cf. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Onthe issue of types of damages,
see 7)ier v. City of Manhattan, 849 F. Supp. 1442, 1443-44 (D. Kan. 1994).
141. See infra Part VI (discussing Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1345 (4th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 771 (1996), and its implications for Title II).
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Other Relevant Provisions

As discussed earlier, the ADA focuses heavily on discrimination in the area
of employment. Title I thus far has been the most discussed and litigated
section of the Act. 42 The central mandate of Tide I is concisely stated: "No
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability'43 because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment."'"
This section has limited application for prisoners. 45 As an employer of
noninmates, prison management will be liable under Tide I for discriminatory
practices or failure to accommodate.' 46 It is not certain, however, that
inmates "employed" within the prison qualify as employees for purposes of this

142. See Harry Stoffer, DisabilitiesLaw Opening Doors, PTrrSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE, Feb. 13,
1994, at Al. The EEOC issued statistical data following its first full year of ADA employment
discrimination policy implementation. See id. Fiscal year 1993 included 87,942 complaints, of which
15,274 (18%) were based at least in part on the ADA. According to the director of the ADA policy
division at EEOC, approximately half of the approximately 20,000 ADA cases since 1992 were filed
by people who lost their jobs. See id. This was similar to the percentages filed claiming discrimination
based on race, sex, or age. Approximately 25 % of the cases claimed lack of "reasonable accommodation." Id. Approximately 12% of cases addressed the claimant's failure to get a job. See id. This
percentage is higher than that generated by other bases of discrimination. The most common disabilities
were back ailments (20%), neurological impairments, emotional and psychiatric conditions, heart
problems, limbs/hand/feet (approximately 5 %), and hearing/vision impairment (approximately 6.4 %).
See id.
143. In Title I of the ADA, "Qualified individual with a disability" is defined as an individual with
a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
145. See White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that prison employment
is not covered under ADA Title I); Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932, 937-38 (E.D.N.C. 1996)
(invoking Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 772 (1996), in
holding that ADA does not apply to prison work programs).
146. See, e.g., Capitano v. State, No. 2CA-CV93-0113, 1993 WL 435941 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct.
29, 1993); Kate Shatzhus, DisabledPrisonOfficer Disputes Suspension, BALT. SUN,July 13, 1994, at
1B (reporting on challenge by fourteen-year veteran of Maryland correctional facility to termination for
disability-based limitation on ability to cover all possible facility positions); see also Najera v. California
Prison Indus. Auth., No. 94-55937, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 12568 (9th Cir. May 16, 1995) (involving
state prison-industry employee's challenge to involuntary transfer); McDonald v. Kansas, 880 F. Supp.
1416 (D. Kan. 1995) (denying claim by former correctional officer claiming failure to accommodate
disability).
On allocation of liability, see McClelland v. Nevada Dep't of Prisons, No. CV-N-94-209-ECR, 1994
WL 497545 (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 1994):
Thus, under a plain reading of the above cited sections of Title I of the ADA, the complaint
states a claim against the defendant individuals because as agents of NDOP they are statutorily
defined as employers.. . . [But] [i]t
is sufficient to note that... both Title VII and the ADEA,
even after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, limit liability for damages to the employer and do not
allow individual employees or officers of a plaintiff's actual employer to be held liable for
damages, whether they be equitable, compensatory or punitive.... Therefore, the failure to
provide for individual liability in those sections carries over into the ADA.
Id. at *1, *3.
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Act. In Williams v. Meese, 47 for example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held:
Although [the prisoner's] relationship with defendants may contain some elements
commonly present in an employment relationship, it arises from [plaintiff's] having
been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in the [defendants'] correctional
institution. The primary purpose of their association [is] incarceration, not
employment.... Since plaintiff has no employment relationship with defendants,
he cannot pursue a claim for discrimination against them under either Title VII or
the ADEA.... The foregoing analysis precludes plaintiff's claims for discrimination under the Equal Pay Act and the RehabilitationAct, as well.'48

In Franks v. Oklahoma State Industries,'49 the same court held that
inmates working for the prison also were not employees for purposes of the

Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).' 50 In Haston v. Tatham, 5' a district
court in the Tenth Circuit specifically conjectured that "it is doubtful that the

ADA applies in the case of a disabled prisoner who seeks prison employment. "1

52

However, the record of judicial opinions regarding employee status for
prison inmates is not entirely clear. In Franks, for example, the court noted
that, where inmates work for private employers'53 or in similar capacities,' 54 they may qualify for employee status. This distinction, while not
perfectly defined, was discussed at greater length by the Ninth Circuit in Moyo
v. Gomez. 55 While there is not a full body of ADA case law addressing this
147. 926 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1991).
148. Id. at 997 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
149. 7 F.3d 971, 972-73 (10th Cir. 1993).
150. Id.; see also McMaster v. Minnesota, 30 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 1994) ("We hold that
inmates ...who are required to work as part of their sentences and perform labor within a correctional
facility as part of a state-run prison industries program are not 'employees' of the state or prison within
the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act."); Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th
Cir. 1993) (holding that inmates are not covered under Fair Labor Standards Act).
151. 842 F. Supp. 483 (D. Utah 1994).
152. Id. at 487. The issue of employee status under the ADA was avoided since the plaintiff's claim
rested on events that predated the effective implementation date for the ADA. See id. at 487-88; see also
Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932 (E.D.N.C. 1996):
This much is clear: no employment relationship of any kind exists between prisoners and their
jailers. It is impossible for prisoners to complain that they have suffered any form of
employment discrimination proscribed by the ADA. Prisoners are put to work as a term of their
confinement. They need not be worried about competing for any jobs in the marketplace, and
have absolutely no interest whatsoever in holding down any particular job within the prison.
Id. at 942.
153. Franks, 7 F.3d at 973 (noting that inmates in work-release program were entitled to minimum
wage coverage of FLSA).
154. See id. (noting that "inmates employed by community college within prison as teaching
assistants may be covered under the economic reality test") (citing Carter v. Dutchess Community
College, 735 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1984)).
155. 32 F.3d 1382, 1385 (9th Cir. 1994). In Moyo, a corrections officer alleged that his termination
resulted from his refusal to discriminate against black inmate workers. The court distinguished between
the defendants' contention that inmates required by law to do hard labor are not "employees," and the
holding in Baker v. McNeil Island Corrections Or., 859 F.2d 124, 128 (9th Cir. 1988), that inmates
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issue, based on the available cases (which look primarily to FLSA and Title
VII) it seems probable that the requirements of the ADA's Title I will apply to
inmates employed by private employers. This conclusion is reinforced by the
strong policy argument against encouraging avoidance of ADA mandates
through employment of prisoners. By contrast, Title I would seem to be
inapplicable to inmates working for the prison itself."5 6
Title III injects the ADAs requirements into the private sector, targeting
57
public accommodations, commercial facilities, and certain private ventures. 1
Accessibility is the primary requirement for private entities under this Title.
Consequently, this section would appear to be of limited application for prison
inmates. However, to the extent that goods or services, including the
certifications available from the private-entity list, can be obtained without their
actual presence (through mail order, for example), it is conceivable that
prisoners might bring suit under this Title. As with private employers of
inmates, it is likely that private suppliers would be held responsible for
accommodation under the Act's provisions insofar as the inmate's incarceration
did not create the obstacle. No public policy justification exists for allowing
private ventures to discriminate, even against prison inmates.
Obstructed access to goods or services due to the inmate's incarceration
would fall outside the AD~s protection.5 8 However, one possible scenario
in which inmates might successfully bring a Title III suit would be an allegedly
discriminatory provision of services or goods to the prison population by a
vendor under contract with prison management. This challenge could take the
form of a Title III suit against the vendor or a Title II suit against prison

working for compensation or training on work-release programs are employees entitled to Title VII
protection. See id.
156. The Tenth Circuit has repeatedly held that prisoners have no right to work and no liberty
interest in the availability or distribution of jobs within the prison setting. Although prisons may not
engage in discriminatory employment practices, such a basic prohibition provides a remedy for only the
most egregious cases. See Franks, 7 F.3d at 972; Williams v. Meese. 926 F.2d 994, 998 (10th Cir.
1991); Ingram v. Papaglia, 804 F.2d 595, 596 (10th Cit. 1986).
157. According to Title III, "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to),
or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9) (1994) (prohibition of
discrimination by public accommodations).
158. The case of State ex rel. Nelson v. Fuerst, 607 N.E.2d 836 (Ohio 1993), is notable, however.
In Nelson, an inmate requested the court to order a public records office to mail documents to the prison
for copying, as the inmate could neither get to the records office to examine the documents nor afford
the records office rate for the copying of all possibly relevant documents. See id. The Ohio Supreme
Court held that the office was not required to mail the requested documents. In two separate dissents,
however, judges noted that the promise of public availability was meaningless to an incarcerated
prisoner. In one dissent, the judge observed that this policy might well violate the ADA with respect
to disabled persons, "ha[ve] a most devastating impact on the right of prisoners," and "implicate[ ] the
equal protection rights of prisoners." Id. at 840 (Wright, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the trend in
judicial holdings does not offer much basis for Title I claims by prisoners. Along with the courts'
traditional restraint when defining prisoners' rights, such a claim would most likely fail under the
.reasonable accommodation" standard of the ADA.
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management for being proprietarily responsible for the services for which they
contract. 519
Title IV primarily addresses the needs of hearing- and speech-impaired
individuals. An amendment to the Communications Act of 1934, this title
mandates the provision of accessible equipment and communications lines
throughout telecommunications networks. Moreover, under this section,
TDDs ' 1° and other auxiliary communications devices must be made available
throughout the national communications network. The implications of this
section for deaf or hearing-impaired inmates-in conjunction with subtitle A of
Title II-are significant. Public entities that communicate by telephone must
make TDD or comparable systems available. 6 ' Prison telephone systems, as
well as all other communication channels, must be adapted to accommodate
deaf and hearing-impaired inmates and visitors. 62 Enforcement of Title IV
provisions may occur by filing with the Federal Communications Commission63 or through a private cause of action for damages.'
Title V serves as a traditional legislative catch-all for clarification and
interest-group-appeasement clauses. As mentioned earlier, states are denied
Eleventh Amendment immunity from prosecution under ADA claims in
appropriate state or federal courts. Moreover, remedies are available at both
law and equity, much like suing a private venture under the Act. Attorney fees
can be awarded to the plaintiff. 65 The United States will find itself sued
under the ADA only on a limited basis, however, as generally the Act does not
apply directly to federal programs."
3.

Accessibility Guidelines and Their Limitations

The standards for structural compliance with ADA requirements are
detailed in literally hundreds of pages of specifications. Titles II and III

159. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A (1994) ("All governmental activities of public entities are covered,
even if they are carried out by contractors.").
160. See supra note 65 (defining TDDs).
161. This may be achieved through relay systems. See supra Subsection I.A.4 (discussing privacy
concerns implicated by relay systems and TDDs).
162. For a good discussion of the problems that deaf inmates experience when deprived of
communications-access tools and other improvements, see Clarkson v. Coughlin, 145 F.R.D. 339
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). See also Niece v. Fitzner, 922 F. Supp. 1208 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (discussing
problems inmates encounter in receiving deaf visitors).
163. Title IV of the ADA amends Title I1 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201276 (1994), and is covered by the latter's remedies and enforcement authority. See ADA § 401(a).
164. Title IV does not specifically authorize a private right of action. The Communications Act of
1934 permits such filings. See 47 U.S.C. § 207 (1994).
165. See ADA § 505.
166. See supratext accompanying note 125. However, ADA Tite V, § 509 (Coverage of Congress
and the Agencies of the Legislative Branch) includes the Senate, the House of Representatives and "each
instrumentality of Congress." These last include "the Architect of the Capitol, the Congressional Budget
Office, the General Accounting Office, the Government Printing Office, the Library of Congress, the
Office of Technology Assessment and the United States Botanic Garden." Id.
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mandate compliance with the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG), 167

although, pending final adoption of the revised ADAAG issued in June 1994,
Title II entities could also achieve
compliance through the Uniform Federal
168
Accessibility Standards (UFAS).
Following passage of the ADA, concern over compliance requirements led
to extensive hearings between state and local government officials and the
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (the Board). In
those discussions, requirements for prisons were actually a substantial
topic. 169 The final interim rule, proposed in June 1994, incorporated the
results of these hearings.'70
The rule presents summaries of the queries and recommendations made by
correctional officials and disability-related professionals. Discussion of the rule
focused largely on the required numbers of accessible holding and long-term
residential cells. State correctional facilities submitted statistical evaluations,
contending that the need for wheelchair-accessible cells warranted a standard
of approximately one to two percent. The Board, citing an increasingly aged
prison population and the probable consequent increase in disabilities, decided
on a minimum of three percent accessible holding or general-housing cells in
new construction. The Federal Bureau of Prisons, which cooperated in the
review process, recommended adaptable rather than accessible cells. The Board
found that this was not an efficient approach in new prison construction,
however.
An additional concern was the location of accessible cells. Unsurprisingly,
the identified tradeoffs were efficiency and security, on the one hand, versus
the integration mandated by the ADA, on the other hand. Acknowledging the
problems with any decision, the Board concluded that there were no facial
assumptions regarding the security risk to or from disabled inmates. As a
result, standardized segregation would not be acceptable under the ADA. The

167. Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,408 (1991) (as
corrected at 56 Fed. Reg. 38,174 (Aug. 12, 1991) and 57 Fed. Reg. 1393 (Jan. 14, 1992)) (to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. § 1191) [hereinafter ADAAG]. Within the ADA is a requirement that the
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board provide minimum guidelines from which
the Departments of Justice and Transportation can develop their final rules. The initial ADAAG were
issued along with the signing of the law and were amended in subsequent months. The Department of
Justice adopted ADAAG for Title 11 and indicated that the Board would probably adopt it as the
standard after a revision. The proposed revised ADAAG was issued in June 1994 and became effective
December 20, 1994. With DOJ adoption of this revised rule, ADAAG became the standard for Tide
II and Tide HI compliance.
168. UFAS serves as the guideline for federal entities' compliance with the Architectural Barriers
Act, as well as the Rehabilitation Act.
169. See Paul Cohan, Locals FearCosts ofADA Implementation, 108 AM. CITY & COUNTY, May
1993, at 14. Confronted by the confusion over requirements, the Board considered a 5% accessible cell
requirement that many officials considered excessive. See id.; see also 59 Fed. Reg. 31,676, 31,698
(1994) (containing comments and responses regarding § 12 "Detention and Correctional Facilities")
(incorporated into the final interim rule issued June 24, 1994).

170. See ADAAG § 12.1.
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final interim rule requires distribution of accessible cells throughout the
correctional facility; the allocation of those cells was not specified, however.
As for "special holding cells" (for protective custody, detoxification, and
medical isolation, among other purposes), at least one accessible cell of each
type must be provided in new construction.
The rule lists additional accessibility requirements for correctional facilities.
For example, common-use areas must be accessible. 7 ' All public entrances
and at least one nonpublic security entrance must be accessible as well.' 72 In
addition, at least five percent, and minimally one percent, of the fixed cubicles
in noncontact visiting areas must be accessible on each side."' An important
distinction throughout discussions of the ADA's impact are the separate
requirements for new construction as opposed to existing facilities. While
reasonable alterations must be made to current structures, all new construction
must fully comply with accessibility guidelines.' 74
The detailed accessibility guidelines of the ADA are not without limitations.
The ADA does not require that all employment opportunities be available to
all disabled persons. Rather, it requires that these opportunities be available to
"qualified" disabled persons insofar as this provision does not egregiously
burden the employer. The "availability of employment" provisions of the ADA
are just beginning to undergo thorough judicial clarification. While employment
discrimination cases comprise the vast majority of ADA litigation to date, the
legal track record is still in the formative stages. 1 5 Equally important is the
fact that the ADA does not require all programs and services to be made
available to all disabled persons. Program access, rather than location access,
is the prevailing directive, although conspicuously segregative practices will not
76
be tolerated. 1
It was of paramount concern to Congress that the Title I and Title III
provisions not so burden businesses as to bankrupt them." 77 Consequently,

171. See id.
172. See id. § 12.2.2.
173. See id. § 12.3.
174. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text (discussing longer prison sentences and boom
in corrections-facility construction).
175. But see Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932 (E.D.N.C. 1996). The court stated that the Fourth
Circuit in Torcasio "specifically declined to reach the question of whether state prisoners have standing
under the ADA. . .. [This] Court holds that the [ADA] does not create a cause of action for state
inmates displeased with their prison work assignments." Id. at 938.
176. Where essentially similar programs can be made available in an alternate accessible location,
the ADA does not require that every location be modified to permit access. The ADA does demand,
however, that disabled participants not be required to attend at the special "disability-accessible"
location. The precise balance among the seemingly inconsistent mandates has yet to be determined.
177. See 135 CONG. REC. S4984, S4997-98 (daily ed. May 9, 1989), which provides:
[T]he Americans With Disabilities Act ... substantially curtails the requirements of
employers and localities contained in the 1988 version of the bill. No longer does a company
have to prove the threat of bankruptcy to be exempt from the requirements; rather, the bill
requires reasonable accommodations for handicapped employees unless such requirement
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there are several available defenses that potentially allow employers and
businesses to avoid full compliance with the Act. These defenses employ the
language of "undue hardship" and "non-readily achievable accommodations." 78
'
The level of expectation imposed on public entities is less forgiving than
that placed on private employers and service providers. It is thus unclear to
what extent the ADNs general tone of reasonableness will be read into Title
II's provisions.
C.

GeneralApplicability to Prisons

Congressional consideration of the ADA did not address prisoners or prison
management. 79 Title I (Employment) and Title III (Public Accommodations
and Private Service Providers) engendered such heated debate that less
economically volatile provisions of the ADAs Title II met with comparatively
minimal review.180 The general debate over the ADA was sketched in terms
of economics' 81 and of the mobility of free individuals; stated differently, the

would pose an undue hardship.
Id. (statement of Sen. Riegle).
178. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985); Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 305 (3d
Cir. 1994) ("The test to determine the reasonableness of a modification is whether it alters the essential
nature of the program or imposes an undue burden or hardship in light of the overall program.") (citing
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987)); Nathanson v. Medical
College, 926 F.2d 1368, 1384-86 (3d Cir. 1991).
179. For an interesting perspective on whether prisoners are "qualified individuals" under the
ADA, see Chief Judge Richard Posner's opinion in Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246 (7th Cir. 1996):
Even if [persons within the prison who are not prisoners] are protected, however, which we
need not decide (for Congress may not have wanted to burden the states with the potentially
enormous costs of making their prisons fully accessible to disabled visitors and employees), it
would not necessarily follow that prisons or jails that offer educational or vocational programs
for prisoners must redesign their programs to accommodate the needs of disabled prisoners. It
is very far from clear that prisoners should be considered 'qualified individual[s]' within the
meaning of the Act.
Id. at 248.
180. Title II, subtitle A receives notably less attention than Titles I, 11I, or even Title II, subtitle
B. Aside from the disparities in quantity of litigation, this section has been largely ignored by law
review authors. See, e.g., Penn Lerblance, Introducing the Americans With DisabilitiesAct: Promises
and Challenges, 27 U.S.F. L. REv. 149, 160-62 (1992) (inverting discussion of Titles II and HI without
apparent reason); Edward J. McGraw, Compliance Costs of theAmericans with DisabilitiesAct, 18 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 521, 528 (1993) (noting that "[t]he second subchapter of the Act relates primarily to public
transportation"); Mullen, supra note 127, at 195-96 (reversing order of subtitles in discussion of Title
II, without explanation, first addressing Transportation (subtitle B) and then considering subtitle A
(referred to disparagingly as "Other Services, Practices and Activities of State and Local Governments")). Granted, the volume of text committed to subtitle B (Transportation issues) is far greater than
that expended on subtitle A. Further, a portion of the cases that can be brought under subtitle A
(employment by state or local governments) may also be filed under Title I. Nonetheless, the
implications of Title II, subtitle A are considerable and the lack of focused attention or interest
is striking.
181. By far, the majority of debate over the legislation addressed this issue. At the signing
ceremony, President Bush noted these concerns, remarking: "We have all been determined to ensure
that it gives flexibility, particularly in terms of the timetable of implementation, and we've been
committed to containing the costs that may be incurred." Gregory Spears, DisabilitiesAct Signed By
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struggle pitted costs against equal protection, centering on equal access to
facilities. Because Titles I and III were largely inapplicable to prisoners,
prisoner concerns were largely ignored. Yet, in contrast to earlier vocationalrehabilitation legislation, the civil rights orientation of the ADA and of the
Rehabilitation Act suggests that Congress intended to level the playing field for
all disabled persons. 182
Eventually, several courts held that Title II "public entities," as used in the
rubric of the ADA, included state and local prisons.' 83 The Justice Department also took notice of the ADA's applicability to prisons, incorporating
correctional facilities among its targets in drafting ADA guidelines." s
However improbably, the ADA thus joined that category of ill-defined moving
targets labelled prisoners' rights.
As recently as the spring of 1995, it appeared that the ADA would be held
applicable to prison operation. The application of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 to federally funded correctional facilities laid the foundation for this
belief, and courts addressing prisoners' ADA claims generally followed in
kind."8 Even a Ninth Circuit case that had questioned the extent to which the
ADA effectively overrode traditional deference to correctional management
acknowledged the ADA's basic applicability to prisons. 86 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, recently disposed of a
pending prisoner ADA claim'8 7 by closely scrutinizing the presumption that
the ADA should have any application to state correctional facilities.' 88
Beyond the Fourth Circuit, the trend has been to apply the ADA with varying

Bush, PHIL. INQUIRER, July 27, 1990, at A8 (quoting President George Bush).
182. Notably, the ADA does not restrict its coverage to citizens; it provides expanded coverage to
'persons." But see Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) ("[Aln
exception to the Americans With Disabilities Act for prisoners, though not express, may have textual
foundation in the term 'qualified individual.'").
183. The presumption was derived from Rehabilitation Act case law citing Bonner v. Lewis, 857
F.2d 559, 561-64 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding Rehabilitation Act applicable to prisons). Whether the ADA
has been clearly held applicable or merely assumed to be so is a subject of dispute, fueled recently by
the Fourth Circuit. See infra Part VI (discussing Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771 (1996)). However, in the wake of the Fourth Circuit decision in Torcasio,
several district and circuit courts have held that the ADA is inapplicable to prisons because they are not
public entities. See, e.g., Bryant, 84 F.3d at 248; Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932, 937-38 (E.D.N.C.
1996); Staples v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 904 F. Supp. 487, 490 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that
Fourth Circuit precedent implies that ADA does not apply in state prison context).
184. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities;
State and Local Government Facilities, § 12, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,676, 31,698 (1994) (to be codified at 36
C.F.R. § 1191).
185. See infra note 190 (citing cases following Bonner v. Lewis).
186. See infra Part VI (discussing Gates v. Rowland).
187. See Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771 (1996);
see also Gorman v. Bishop, 919 F. Supp. 326, 331 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (expanding Torcasio to apply to
arrests).
188. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1344-46. In fact, the Fourth Circuit has cast some doubt on the entire
premise of Title II. See id.; see also Staples, 904 F. Supp. at 490 (using language of Fourth Circuit in
Torcasio to support conclusion that ADA does not apply to state prisons).
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degrees of deference. As a result, whether the mandates of the ADA, subject
to official review, merely impose responsibilities on prison administrators or
actually grant rights to inmates is unclear. Only recently has this issue received
attention within the judicial process. Given the current conservative political
climate in Congress, there may be a legislative clarification of the ADA (to the
detriment of prisoners) before the courts have completed their exegeses. 18 9
Pending such restrictive amendments, however, an analysis of the application
of the ADA to prisons is critical. An examination of the interplay between
ADA statutory rights and the prison context illustrates how thoroughly the
latter defines legal rights of inmates in American correctional facilities.
IV.

SOME LEGAL ASPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF ADXs TITLE II

As late as May 1995, the extent of the ADAs application had been
seriously challenged, but the threshold issue of whether it applied to prisons at
all seemed to be resolved. Courts had recognized that the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 applied to prisons."9 Logically, the ADA, as an extension of the
Rehabilitation Act, also would apply. Nevertheless, it was hardly acknowledged
automatically. Whether questioned outright or cloaked in deference to prison
officials, the application of the ADA to prisons was initially suspect.
That state of indecision passed as court rulings either held officials
responsible or relieved them only by virtue of qualified immunity. The core
issue of general applicability seemed established.' 9' Consistent with this

premise, the Justice Department consulted with corrections officials in
developing guidelines," 9 and in 1994 it issued several reports specifically

addressing the applicability of the ADA to the criminal justice system. The
Title I/II employment booklet, The Americans with Disabilities Act and

189. There are all too many ways in which prisoner access to the ADA may be lost. The costs of
compliance for state facilities, as well as the public's displeasure with what is perceived as soft-on-crime
coddling of dangerous inmates, provide sufficient motivation for legislators to curtail inmate recourse
to the ADA. Moreover, as additional responsibilities are shifted to the states themselves, federal
opportunities to monitor or influence compliance will lessen, if not disappear altogether.
190. See Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 551-64 (9th Cir. 1988). Subsequent discussions cited to
Bonner and built on its analysis. See, e.g., Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1349 (noting that court in Bonner was
first to apply Rehabilitation Act to prisons); Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994)
(acknowledging that Rehabilitation Act applies to prisons receiving federal funding); Little v. Lycoming
County, 912 F. Supp. 809, 819 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that Ninth Circuit retreated from its Bonner
holding that section 504 applied to prisons). But see Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir.
1991) (holding that section 504 "does not give plaintiff any substantive rights since the Federal Bureau
of Prisons does not fit the definition of 'programs or activities' governed by that section").
191. See Bruce Tomaso, Inmate Petitions Decried, Data Requests Clog Systems, Officials Say,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 9, 1995, at 2. The Executive Director of the Department of Criminal
Justice listed the ADA as one reason inmates are adequately protected from discrimination. See also
Official Urges Limit on Inmate Access to Courts, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1994, at 3 (noting that Attorney
General, discussing wasteful lawsuits, indicated that those would not include suits filed under ADA).
192. See supra note 129.
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Criminal Justice: Hiring New Employees, 93 explains the requirements for
hiring and employee management." 9
The Title II services booklet, The Americans with Disabilities Act and
Criminal Justice: Providing Inmate Services,i 9e summarizes the applicability
of Title II to inmate care. These guidelines discuss ADA requirements and
available defenses to complete compliance. This publication left no doubt that
the Justice Department believed that state correctional facilities fell under the
ADA's authority.se Yet the Justice Department booklet did not necessarily
dominate judicial opinions on the matter.
A. Liability of State Governments and Individual Officials
Traditionally, the Eleventh Amendment' 9' protected state governments
from prosecution under federal statutes such as § 1983. However, that
protection can be eliminated by congressional mandate.' 98 ADA Title II,
section 502 clearly reads: "A state shall not be immune under the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal
or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this Act." Moreover,
the remedies available in suits against the state are equivalent to those available
in actions against other parties, public or private. Establishing state liability
remains an uphill challenge;' 19 but the official vulnerability of a normally
immune governing entity encourages compliance by that entity and underscores
the comprehensive intentions of the legislation itself.

193. PAULA N. RUBIN, THE AMERICANS winH DISABILITIES ACT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HIRING
NEW EMPLOYEES (National Institute of Justice, Oct. 1994).
194. Notably, ADA requirements changed several standard employer practices-including the use
of written examinations, polygraphs, and agility tests, as well as medical and psychological examinations-prior to the issuance of a job offer. As a consequence of the ADA, these procedures are now
precluded until an applicant has been offered a position based on disability-neutral criteria.
195. PAULA N. RUBIN & SUSAN W. MCCAMPBELL, THE AMERICANS WiTH DISABILITIES ACT AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING INMATE SERVICES (National Institute of Justice, July 1994).
196. It also recognized that the degree of ADA application was unclear. See id.
197. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."). This clause has been read
generally to preclude suits against states in federal courts. See, e.g., Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum
Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1996); Native Village of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1511
(9th Cit. 1994); Bockes v. Fields, 999 F.2d 788, 790 (4th Cir. 1993).
198. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 49 (1976). The intent to waive states' immunity, however, must be explicitly stated in the
legislation. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989).
199. The doctrine of qualified immunity frequently operates to protect the states and the federal
government from liability. It "enables a public official to avoid suit on an alleged constitutional or
federal law violation where the law governing the claimed right was not clearly established at the time
of the official's conduct." Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1010 (1lth Cir. 1996) (citing Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)). For example, qualified immunity was granted to the police officers
in Gorman v. Bishop, 919 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Mo. 1996), when the court determined that the officers
"could not have been expected to know" that the ADA applied to that situation. Id. at 331.
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Even where a violation of ADA standards is established, the plaintiff may
lose, because qualified immunity provides a potential defense to administrators
acting in their official capacity.2' The availability of this defense depends on
whether a court finds that the defendant had reasonable notice of the standard
or legal requirement alleged to have been violated.2 ' If the defendant had
clear notice, the qualified-immunity defense may not be available. The plaintiff
bears the burden,2 2 however, of proving that qualified immunity is not
available.2 3 Further, a successful qualified-immunity claim will generally
2 °4
defeat whatever violations the plaintiff has established.
The national applicability of the ADA, as well as the comprehensive public
education campaign that accompanied its passage, precludes a claim of
qualified immunity in all but the borderline cases. Public officials will not be
permitted to claim unawareness of the ADA. But they may be able to argue
successfully that its requirements are obscure in certain circumstances. 25
Moreover, courts will disagree concerning the affirmative responsibility placed
on prison officials to provide program access and facilities without proactive

200. Qualified immunity applies to all government officials not protected by absolute immunity.
See, e.g., Mason, 82 F.3d at 1010; Gorman, 919 F. Supp. at 331. Judges are almost completely
protected by this defense. See, e.g., Turgeon v. Brock, No. Civ. 94-269-SD, 1994 WL 529919, at *2
(D.N.H. Sept. 29, 1994):
It is well established that judges have "absolute immunity from civil liability for any normal and
routine judicial act". "A judge does not lose immunity because an action is erroneous,
malicious, in excess of his authority, or disregardful of elementary principles of procedural due
process, as long as the judge had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him."
Id. (citations omitted).
201. See, e.g., Felce v. Fiedler, 974 F.2d 1484, 1501 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that defendants were
qualifiedly immune because procedural rights were not clearly established so as to infer notice); see also
Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185, 188 (6th Cir. 1993) ("Chaboudy is not entitled to qualified
immunity if he violated clearly established law of which a reasonable prison physician would have been
aware."); Parsons v. Wright, 649 A.2d 1108, 1111 (Me. 1994) (finding individual defendants who
claimed unfamiliarity with statutory requirements for treatment of handicapped inmates entitled to
qualified immunity defense, while county officers allegedly "unaware of their statutory duties with
respect to the jail" were not so entitled); Santiago v. Leik, 508 N.W.2d 456, 458 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993)
("One purpose of qualified immunity is to spare a public official 'not only unwarranted liability, but
unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a lawsuit.'") (citations omitted).
202. The plaintiff must establish that his constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated.
See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Furthermore, the plaintiff must meet a
heightened opening pleading standard. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-32 (1991).
203. See Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 1993) (challenging segregated
housing for HIV-positive inmates). A law is clearly established when "the contours of the right [are]
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
204. See supra note 199.
205. See, e.g., Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that, from spring 1993
through early 1994, neither application of ADA to state prisons nor qualification of morbid obesity as
disability was "clearly established"), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 771 (1996). But see Noland v. Wheatley,
835 F. Supp. 476, 488 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (holding that, even in early 1992, defendants could be expected
to know their responsibilities under ADA).
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inmate demands.' Nevertheless, these cases are uncommon exceptions to
the presumption of adequate notice.
B.

Remedies

The availability of damages to prisoner litigants under Title II of the ADA
remains unresolved.2 7 Title II incorporates the damages available in section
505 of the Rehabilitation Act20 8 and includes attorney's fees and some
expenses. 2' These remedies were originally adopted from Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.210 It is unclear how amenable the courts will be to
granting these monetary awards.
The expansion of available damages authorized in the 1991 Civil Rights
Act-including a provision for punitive damages-applies to ADA claims.2 1'
Although the Act specifically mentioned the change in available damages for
ADA Title I claims, it did not refer specifically to Title II. Courts have taken
different positions regarding the availability of damages in Title II cases. One
theory holds that the explicit reference to the effects of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act on Title I damages indicates that Congress did not intend to extend these
changes to Title 11.212 An alternative theory holds that, historically at
common law and throughout judicial rulings, remedies are presumed to exist
in the absence of explicit language excluding them.213 This position would
206. See, e.g., Lue v. Moore, 43 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1994) (expressing concern over
whether inmate must request accommodation before bringing ADA suit).
207. The recognition of punitive damages may present particular problems for prisoners. Although
such damages might be seen as a prisoner's right, it is unlikely that a prisoner will gain enough public
sympathy to have a realistic chance of obtaining punitive damages. The prisoner's right might be
subordinated to fears about the cost that punitive damages would inflict upon the penal system. The
public might also rely on the perception that punitive damages would encourage frivolous lawsuits by
prisoners "with nothing else to do."
208. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1994) (Rehabilitation Act).
209. See ADA § 505 (attorney's fees).
210. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d4(a) (1994).
211. Some members of Congress felt that any additional or expanded damages authorized under
the 1991 Civil Rights Act should not be available to ADA litigants. Representative Sensenbrenner
introduced an amendment to the ADA to limit victims of disability-based job discrimination to remedies
then available under Title VII of the 1964 legislation. See 136 CONG. REC. H2599-01 (daily ed. 1990).
However, the amendment was voted down. It was pointed out that the purpose of ADA was to bring
disabled persons under coverage that was equal to the benefits contained in other civil rights legislation.
212. See Harrelson v. Elmore County, 859 F. Supp. 1465, 1468 (M.D. Ala. 1994):
On its face, Title II of the ADA does not provide for an award of punitive damages. Moreover,
Congress' express provision of punitive damages under Title I of the ADA via the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, counsels against a statutory construction that punitive damages are available under Title
II by inference.
(citation omitted).
213. See Rodgers v. Magnet Cove Pub. Schs., 34 F.3d 642, 644-45 (8th Cir. 1994) ("The
[Supreme] Court announced the general rule that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the
federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought
pursuant to a federal statute.") (internal quotations marks omitted); see also Torcasio v. Murray, 862
F. Supp. 1482, 1489 (E.D. Va. 1994) (referring to Fourth Circuit holding "that under certain
circumstances plaintiffs proceeding under the Rehabilitation Act are entitled to the full panoply of legal
remedies") (citation omitted), rev'd in part, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771
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allow4 for the granting of expanded damages if appropriate to the case at
21

bar.

Whether the award of damages will reflect the defendant's intent more than
the violation's effect on the plaintiff is similarly open to conjecture. Certain
Rehabilitation Act cases suggest a judicial reading of the statute as corrective
rather than compensatory. Presumably, ADA remedies would be interpreted
analogously. Equitable relief has been the more frequent purpose and
consequence of inmate litigation under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
There is no bar, however, to awarding damages to prisoners, and attorney fees
and expenses have been granted to inmates filing other claims of discrimination. 1 5 It is unclear what overall effect the ADA will have on these determinations. Moreover, it is unlikely that punitive damages will be awarded unless
an exceptionally egregious case arises.
The rejection of an administrative exhaustion requirement under Title II
represents a particularly significant change with regard to ADA remedies. Even
the Rehabilitation Act had required that available administrative remedies be
exhausted prior to bringing suit. The elimination of this requirement under
Title II opens state and federal courts to ADA actions by prisoners without the
usual delays of administrative processes.
C. Diminished or DisappearingIntent Requirement
Disabled prisoners' civil rights claims have always contended with
unresolved intent requirements." 6 While bringing § 1983 claims alleging
Eighth Amendment violations, prisoners have run headlong into the "deliberate
indifference" standard. 217 This issue may prove to be among the most
important effects of the ADA, especially for prisoner litigants.

(1996).
214. See Love v. McBride, 896 F. Supp. 808, 811 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (upholding ADA Title II
violation plus damages in amount of $1000 and remanding case on issue of amount of damages).
215. See, e.g., Lowrance v. Coughlin, 862 F. Supp. 1090, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting
compensatory damages of $132,000 and punitive damages of $25,000).
216. Law journals abound with discussion of the conflict between discriminatory impact and
discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Robert Belton, The Dismantlingof the Griggs DisparateImpact Theory
and the Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 223 (1990)
(employment context); Leah Farish, The Intent Requirement at the Crossroads:RacialDiscrimination
and City of Memphis v. Greene, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 309 (1982) (residential property rights); D. Don
Welch, Removing DiscriminatoryBarriers:Basing DisparateTreatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than
Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (1987) (employment context); James Wrona, Eradicating Sex
Discrimination in Education: Extending DisparateImpact Analysis to Title IX Litigation, 21 PEPP. L.
REV. 1 (1993) (educational context); Celynda L. Brasher, Note, A New Standard of ProofforTitle VII
Disparate Impact Cases: Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 34 ST. LoUIs U. L.J. 669 (1990)
(employment context).
217. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In his dissent, Justice Stevens contended that the
Court's focus on intent should be relevant only to remedy and not to determining whether a
constitutional violation has occurred. See id. at 111-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The ADA does not explicitly require a showing of intent to establish
discrimination. But the courts have yet to resolve the question. Arguably, the
act of discriminating against disabled persons requires intent to do so.
However, mere obstruction of access to employment, programs, or services as
a consequence of disability violates its provisions. Given the generally objective
presentation of the ADAs requirements, which are even clinical in certain
sections, intent may no longer be a required element for prevailing claims.218
Certainly, any lowering of the requirements for successful claims could only
improve prisoner litigants' prospects. However, inmates confront a long line
of cases lost for inability to establish intent, notwithstanding a compelling
factual display of substandard or inadequate conditions." 9 Thus, to the extent
that the ADA does erode or eliminate intent as an element for successful
claims, this legislative change may have profound implications.
D. Objective Standards
In contrast to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the text of the ADA
was laden with detail. Title II, Part A follows a detailed roadmap for
compliance included elsewhere in the legislation. This degree of specificity has
several consequences. First, compliance becomes easier with the clear
identification of requisite standards. Second, failure to comply becomes more
easily identifiable, either for purposes of contemplating legal action or for
resolution of the litigation itself. Third, the quantity of detail distances the issue
of compliance from personal, subjective conditions. Notwithstanding the
available defenses,' a ramp is either there or it is not, and it is either
graded correctly or it is not. The question becomes less whether the particular
plaintiff personally needs a ramp to a specified grade at a particular location,
and more whether the building should have a ramp for purposes of compliance
with the ADA. 2 This small, incremental change could benefit inmate

218. See Concerned Parents to Save Dreher Park Ctr. v. City of West Palm Beach, 846 F. Supp.
986, 991 (D. Fla. 1994) ("Certainly intentional discrimination is banned by Title I1. But further, actions
that have the effect of discriminating against individuals with disabilities likewise violate the ADA.");
Peoples v. Nix, No. Civ. A 93-5892, 1994 WL 423856, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1994) ("A showing
of discriminatory intent is not necessary to sustain a claim of violation of the ADA.").
219. See, e.g., Staples v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 904 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(dismissing plaintiff's claim for failure to establish intent); see also supra notes 87-91 and accompanying
text. See generally Gary A. Cook, Applying the Brakes to Prison Reform Litigation-Wilson v. Seiter
and Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County, 17 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 135 (1993) (observing that brief
trend toward prison reform is moribund); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Leading Cases, 108 HARv.
L. REv. 139, 231 (1994) (noting that "virtually insurmountable barrier [hinders] inmates who challenge
the conditions of their confinement").
220. See supra Section V.A.
221. But see Gorman v. Bishop, 919 F. Supp. 326, 331 (W.D. Mo. 1996). In Gorman, a
paraplegic arrestee's ADA claim against the police department was dismissed because the court felt that
the police officers could not be held responsible for their failure to comply with the ADA by having a
wheelchair accessible van for arrestees. See id.
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plaintiffs because it removes the stigma of an individual looking for "special
treatment"222 and focuses once again on the notion of equal access, which
was the original purpose of both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. For
litigation purposes, plaintiffs must still meet the "qualified individual with a
disability" threshold requirement. In addition, courts will still make short shrift
of claims in which the plaintiff cannot show personal injury resulting from the
alleged discrimination. Thus, the personal focus is not eliminated, but rather,
subdued in the judicial considerations following that initial qualification. In
effect, the reasonableness of an inmate's request is bolstered by preexisting
standards incorporated within the ADA.
That the ADA may objectify standards for physical and programmatic
access is of considerable importance. To the extent that courts look predominantly to the specific circumstances of the claim and their impact on the
plaintiff, a litigant's status as a prisoner could set a lower standard for
acceptable conditions. However, courts instead may begin to find more
objective minimum standards, as opposed to the "rational basis" standard that
they have often utilized in the past. While the ADA's provisions may not be
applied with equal vigor in prison settings, the articulation of basic structural
requirements without respect to beneficiary may inhibit the development of
implicitly separate standards for prisoners.

V.

JUDICIAL CONSTRAINTS

A. The Class: Disabled Individuals and Levels of Judicial Review
Historically, the courts have not accorded disabled persons suspect-class
status for purposes of equal protection review.223 City of Cleburne v.

222. But see Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246 (7th Cir. 1996). Chief Judge Posner dismissed a
paraplegic inmate's claim under the ADA for the prison's failure to supply a bed with guardrails. The
inmate fell and broke his leg. Judge Posner stated:
Even if there were (as we doubt) some domain of applicability of the Act to prisoners, the Act
would not be violated by a prison's simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled
prisoners. No discrimination is alleged; Bryant was not treated worse because he was disabled.
His complaint is that he was not given special accommodation .... [He is not complaining of
being excluded from some prison service, program, or activity. . . . He is complaining about
incompetent treatment of his paraplegia. The ADA does not create a remedy for medical
malpractice.... Sleeping in one's cell is not a "program" or "activity."
Id. at 249.
223. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932, 942 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
Suspect-class status qualifies for strict or heightened judicial scrutiny. The level of scrutiny applied
substantially influences prospects for a successful claim. The only legislative action to survive strict
scrutiny was internment of the Japanese during World War H. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944). By contrast, very little fails under rational-basis review, which accepts any reasonable and
relevant purpose as adequate justification for the legislative enactment.
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Cleburne Living Center, Inc.224 exemplifies this denial of suspect-class status.
In Cleburne, the Supreme Court purported to apply a rational-basis analysis
even as it undertook what can only be described as at least quasi-suspect
intermediate scrutiny. Officially disabled persons were not recognized as
meriting even intermediate scrutiny.'
According to the "ratchet theory" of Equal Protection Clause analysis, 226
Congress has the power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to raise
the protective standing of persons. The success of these attempts has
varied.227 Congress clearly indicated its intention to override Cleburne's
judicially established standard when it drafted the opening "findings" of the
ADA. In its observations, the classic "indicia of suspectness" are listed as if
straight from a constitutional law textbook.228 While Congress unmistakably
intended that the courts consider disabled persons a suspect class, the judiciary
thus far has resisted this invitation,29 leaving open the critical question of
whether the ADA will ever bring disability cases under strict scrutiny. If strict
scrutiny is employed, then the prototypical case pattern would be found in

224. 473 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985) (deciding that court of appeals erred in holding mental
retardation quasi-suspect classification calling for more exacting standard of judicial review than that
normally accorded economic and social legislation).
225. See Pierce, 918 F. Supp. at 942:
Plaintiff's claim under the Equal Protection Clause does not require much comment. Disabled
individuals do not constitute a suspect class. . . . The Court thus analyzes plaintiff's equal
protection claim under the rational basis test, and concludes that it is rational to base workassignment decisions on a prisoner's ability, or lack thereof, to perform particular tasks.
Id. (citations omitted).
226. See Matt Pawa, When the Supreme CourtRestricts ConstitutionalRights, Can Congress Save
Us? An Examinationof Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1993). The
basic premise of the ratchet theory is that Congress, though prohibited from reducing the constitutional
protection afforded to citizens, can raise these levels to effect appropriate ends.
227. In Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993), petitioner raised an argument for judicial review
of state distinction between treatment of mentally retarded individuals and mentally ill individuals.
Justice Souter, dissenting, acknowledged the argument and declined to address the matter:
This approach complies with two of the cardinal rules governing the federal courts: one, never
to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the
other never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is to be applied ... and is consistent with our past practice.
Id. at 2651 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
228. See supra note 130.
229. In More v. Farrier,984 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1993), the court cited Cleburne in ruling that
'wheelchair-bound inmates are not a suspect class." Id. at 271. In a footnote, the court acknowledged
the inmates' claim that "they are entitled to heightened scrutiny as a result of 'increased federal and state
concerns over the rights of handicapped individuals.'" but concluded that "[t]hese statutes do not,
however, purport to alter the standard for constitutional equal protection claims." Id. at 271 n.4 (citing
ADA as well as state code). Admittedly, the ADA is moot for this case, as the events in Farrier
predated ADA's implementation by four to five years. Subsequently, in Haston v. Tatham, 842 F. Supp.
483 (D. Utah 1994), the court stated that, "even if plaintiff could show discriminatory intent, his claims
could not survive the summary judgment motion." Id. at 487. For purposes of equal protection analysis,
persons with disabilities do not constitute a suspect class. With the lack of public sympathy for disabled
inmates, as well as the focus on cost, it appears that prisoners' rights activists may not be successful in
adding the class of disabled prisoners to the list of suspect classes.
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inmate cases alleging racial discrimination. 23° Courts reluctant to adopt strictscrutiny standards for disabled prisoners may also find discussion in the case
law of quasi-suspect class standing, primarily based on gender-discrimination
claims. 31
B.

The Context: Prisons and Appropriate Levels of JudicialDeference

The unique nature of prisons indicates that even fundamental rights may be
restricted or curtailed in the interest of prison security or discipline, and courts
historically have deferred to decisions of prison administrations. This deference
rests on an unresolved controversy regarding the rights that prisoners retain
following incarceration. Theorists argue either that, as a consequence of their
conviction, prisoners are essentially stripped of all rights except those that
exigencies and efficiencies of prison administration leave them, or that
prisoners retain all constitutional rights except those that are necessarily
precluded by prison needs and priorities.232 In more deferential times, courts
have held that considerable nonintrusion is necessary for efficient prison
management and because courts are not the appropriate entities to second-guess
management decisions.233 In less deferential periods, courts have reminded

230. See supra note 80 (addressing racial-discrimination claims in prison setting).
231. See, e.g., Pargo v. Elliott, No. 94-3399, 1995 WL 107504 (8th Cir. Mar. 15, 1995)
(questioning automatic application of Turner standard in discussion of whether female and male prison
inmates could be deemed similarly situated for purposes of equal protection analysis); Jeldness v.
Pearce, Nos. 91-36271, 91-36350, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 19403 (9th Cir. July 28, 1994) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to challenge by class of women prisoners and concluding that "penological
necessity is not a defense to Title IX"); Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting
equal protection challenge to separate incarceration of D.C.'s female prisoners in location distant from
the District; court found arrangement within legitimate administrative needs); West v. Virginia Dep't
of Corrections, 847 F. Supp. 402, 406-07 (W.D. Va. 1994) (applying intermediate scrutiny to hold that
"legitimate government interest" did not justify discriminatory access to Boot Camp Incarceration
program on basis of sex); Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979). Glover held that
.parity of treatment," versus identical treatment between male and female correctional populations, is
the correct standard for prison, and that, where "[p]laintiffs in this case have presented clear evidence
that the rehabilitation opportunities afforded them are substantially inferior to those available to the
State's male prisoners in terms of both the quality and variety of programming offered," they stated a
compelling equal protection claim. Id. at 1101.
232. See Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2206-07 (1996) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
233. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974):
More fundamentally, this attitude springs from complementary perceptions about the nature of
the problems and the efficacy of judicial intervention. Prison administrators are responsible for
maintaining internal order and discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized
access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources
allow, the inmates placed in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of
these duties are too apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons
in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible
of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment
of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive
branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the
increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform.... Judicial recognition of
that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal
institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate
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critics that prisoners, while somewhat out of sight, nonetheless remain a
legitimate concern for the judiciary in its vigilant protection of individual
liberty.

234

Certainly, these characterizations of prisoners' rights could yield precisely
the same result in any given case. The emphases are conspicuously inverted,
however; thus, where judicial balancing tests are concerned, the particular
version of rights theory chosen considerably affects the outcome. Judicial
deference to prison management will not disappear as a consequence of the
ADA. The comprehensive nature of the ADA's mandate, however, as well as
its objective of looking at structural accessibility instead of subjective effects
on individual claimants, may cause judicial decisionmakers to confer slightly
less automatic deference to correctional administrators.235
The prevailing standard for judicial deference to prison management
emerged in Turner v. Safley, 2 36 in which an inmate challenged the constitutionality of restrictions on inmate marriages and inmate-to-inmate correspondence.2 37 Responding to an Eighth Circuit application of strict scrutiny, the
Supreme Court demurred: "[A] lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate in
determining the constitutionality of the prison rules." 238 Following a review
of prior holdings considering prisoners' rights, the Court issued what has
become known as the Turner "reasonableness test," consisting of four
elements. The first requirement is "a valid rational connection" between the
regulation and the alleged governmental interest. 39 The second inquiry is
whether alternative means exist for inmates to exercise the right under
consideration. 2' The third issue is the effect that accommodation of the
asserted right will have on security, administrative efficiency, prison staff, and
prison authorities.
Id. at 404-05. In a footnote, Justice Powell provided further discussion of the inappropriateness of
federal courts "to act as the front-line agencies for the consideration and resolution of the infinite variety
of prisoner complaints. Moreover, the capacity of our criminal justice system to deal fairly and fully
with legitimate claims will be impaired by a burgeoning increase of frivolous prisoner complaints." Id.
at 405 n.9.
234. See Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("We agree that prison authorities have wide discretion to decide on appropriate methods of handling their wards. However, such
discretion is not unlimited, and where 'paramount federal constitutional or statutory rights' come into
play the prison regulations must conform to them.").
235. But see Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1344-46 (4th Cir. 1995) (taking dim view of
federal court intervention in core state functions such as prison management), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
772 (1996).
236. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
237. See id.
238. Id. at 81.
239. Id. at 89 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). The government objective
must be neutral. Where the relationship between the state's interest and the regulation is tenuous, the
court will look closely for indications of arbitrary or abusive action. See id. at 89-90.
240. See id. at 90 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 131
(1977)). If alternatives exist for inmates to exercise their rights, "courts should be particularly conscious
of the 'measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials... in gauging the validity of the
regulation.'" Id. (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
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the larger inmate population. 24' The final prong of the test is whether an
alternative means exists for prison officials to accomplish their objectives
without infringing on inmates' rights. This last element is not a leastrestrictive-alternative test. If there exists one or more reasonable alternatives,
however, the courts may consider this point in their analysis. 42
Subsequently, in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,243 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the Turner standard with respect to alleged infringement of inmates'
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. The Court reversed a Third
Circuit decision, explaining: "To ensure that courts afford appropriate
deference to prison officials, we have determined that prison regulations
alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a 'reasonableness' test
less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of
fundamental constitutional rights."'4
The Ninth Circuit created considerable controversy in 1994, holding that
the Turner standard applied to statutory rights such as those created by the
ADA. In Gates v. Rowland,2 45 the court reversed a lower court's ruling that
denial of food-service positions to HIV-positive inmates discriminated against
them impermissibly.246 Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that the reasonableness
gauge of Turner should prevail.247 Arguing that, where constitutional
protections bend, statutory privileges must too, the court accepted the
penological concerns maintained by prison officials.24 The implications of
this ruling are profound, as it subjects the ADA as well as other statutory
rights to Turner's accommodating guidelines.249
Not all circuit courts have concurred with Gates, however. In Pargo v.
Elliott, ° for example, the Eighth Circuit stated:
Not all reviews of prison policies or practices require judicial deference . ... The
District of Columbia Circuit held in Pitts v. Thornburgh that the Turner standard
of scrutiny was inapplicable to the District of Columbia's policy of housing women

241. See id. at 90 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 132-33
(1977)). The intention is that deference to prison officials' judgment should increase in proportion to
the expected effects of the proposed accommodation.
242. See id. at 91 ("[I]f an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the
prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence
that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.").
243. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
244. Id. at 349.
245. 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
246. See id. at 1448.
247. See id. at 1447-48.
248. See id. at 1444.
249. See William C. Collins, Use of Turner Test Deferring to Institutions' Security Concerns May
Sharply'LimitInmates'ADA Protection, CORRECIONAL L. REP., Feb. 1995, at 65 (describing decision
as "startling" and concluding that, if Turner application stands, ADA's "ultimate impact may be
dramatically reduced").
250. 49 F.3d 1355 (8th Cir. 1995).
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inmates in a distant facility and men inmates in a nearby institution because the
practice involved "general budgetary and policy choices." . . . Turner does not
foreclose all heightened judicial review. . . . Our cases also indicate that Turner
does not render prison regulations immune from judicial review."I

Arguably, whether statutory rights are subjected to formal Turner analysis or
instead are simply drained by a generic deference to prison concerns, the
results for a litigant's case will be the same. The route the courts take,
however, alters the debate thereafter.
Following closely on the heels of deference to prison management is the
deference accorded to professional judgment. Much as prison management is
granted quasi-expert standing by the courts, physicians are accorded heightened
standing for their exercise of judgment. In cases challenging medical care, or
lack thereof, courts regularly discuss the extent to which they should defer to
the professional judgment of the attending physician or administrator. 2
VI.

ADA-BASED PRISONER LITIGATION To DATE

Thus far, there have been relatively few ADA cases involving prisoners.
Although the law was enacted in 1990, provisions within each Title took effect
over a several-year period. Of the claims filed, most are Title I employment
claims." The majority of Title II's requirements took effect in January
1992."5 Given the time delay involved in filing, trying, and appealing a case,
the factual basis for most recent prisoner litigation predates the ADA2" and
the prevailing understanding is that the ADA is not retroactive."

251. Id. at 1357 (citations omitted).
252. See, e.g., Cameron v. Tomes, 990 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Professional judgment, as
the Supreme Court has explained, creates only a 'presumption' of correctness; welcome or not, the final
responsibility belongs to the courts.") (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)): see also
Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690, 694 (D. Neb. 1970) (holding that courts should defer to physicians'
judgment on issue of whether inadequate medical treatment is being rendered).
253. See supra note 142. Title II education-related claims rate a distant second.
254. ADA § 205(a).
255. See, e.g., Haston v. Tatham, 842 F. Supp. 483,487 (D. Utah 1994) (dismissing ADA portion
of claim because events predated Title I's date of implementation).
256. See, e.g., Huston v. Nadim, No. 93-16760, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 6337 (9th Cir. Mar. 9,

1995) (dismissing petitioner's ADA-based claims arising from 1991 events as barred for nonretroactivity
of ADA); Aramburu v. Boeing Co., No. 93-4064-SAC, 1993 WL 544567, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 29,
1993) (finding ADA not retroactive). But see Raya v. Maryatt Indust., 829 F. Supp. 1169, 1173 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (reasoning that, although delayed effective date suggests no congressional intent for ADA
to apply retroactively, such date is not dispositive of issue).
Attention has been drawn to Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), in which
the plaintiffs were granted leave to amend with addition of an ADA claim even though the events in
question arose prior to Title II's effectiveness date. See id. at 1051-52. Although not clarified by the
court, it appears that the claim addressed ongoing problems that brought more recent action within the
appropriate time frame. See infra notes 288-93 and accompanying text (discussing Clarkson).
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An additional problem that arises when researching cases in this field is the
frequency of settlements.257 While settlements may avoid the expense of
protracted litigation and, indeed, do secure some relief for inmates, they also
result in a misleading shortage of case law."s
Therefore, as a result of timing and settlements, there is relatively little
case history to analyze. Moreover, case "results" are mostly still pending.
Where decisions have been handed down, the results are either negative or
merely confirm the applicability of the ADA to prisons. It remains to be seen
how much relief the plaintiffs in these cases will actually receive. Nevertheless,
the existing cases merit review, if only to provide a sense of the issues and
problems inherent in bringing prison-based ADA claims.
Several cases presenting ADA-based claims have run into procedural walls.
The plaintiff in Tomey v. Gissy, 2 9 for example, complained about abusive
treatment and inadequate facilities for handicapped persons at the county
jail. 2" A federal court held that his suit was time-barred under the AD~s
180-day complaint filing requirement. 26' Another federal district court,
however, held that the 180-day limitations period applied only to agency filings
2 63
and did not preclude later federal court filings. 2 62 In Haston v. Tatham,
257. Example 1: A case originally brought in 1989 against a doctor at a New Jersey prison initially
resulted in the state succeeding in having the case dismissed. However, the passage of time allowed for
additional evidence to be gathered and additional plaintiffs to be identified. In June 1994, the case was
settled with five inmates and the estate of a sixth receiving a total amount of $275,000. The physician,
may be liable for up to $50,000 if he is not indemnified by the attorney general's office. The same
physician also recently settled an inmate-initiated case for $150,000. Both cases result from events at
Bayside Prison. The physician is continuing as a medical-services provider to the Cape May County Jail,
also in New Jersey. There have been allegations and charges surrounding that location as well. See
Linda Bean, Prison M.D. May Have to Pay Inmates, N.J. L.J., July 4, 1994, at 8; Linda Bean, Suing
the JailhouseDoc, N.J. L.J., Nov. 8, 1993, at 1.
Example 2: A California suit brought by a paraplegic inmate against Santa Clara County officials
was settled on February 3, 1993. The inmate requested injunctive relief and unspecified damages, based
on alleged violations of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and various state statutes. The
settlement is essentially one of equitable relief, with accommodation of the inmate's needs by the county.
Costs and fees are to be borne by each side. See Angela Baughman, Big Deals, Big Suits, RECORDER,
Feb. 25, 1993, at 5.
Example 3: Gates v. Rowland, which challenged conditions for physically disabled and HIV-positive
inmates in the California correctional system resulted in a settlement agreement that applied only to the
Vacaville prison facility. (There has since been continuous litigation regarding details of implementation.
Accepting the recommendations of a magistrate judge, a United States district judge has levied
substantial fines against the State of California and threatened imprisonment for contempt if the
Department of Corrections does not honor the consent agreement.) See 3 PRISONERS AND THE LAW app.
B-112 to -114 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1996).
258. This is the unreported underside of prison-conditions litigation, complicating an assessment
of how actively inmates are pursuing the remedies made available by ADA and other legislation.
259. 832 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. W. Va. 1993).
260. See id.
261. Title II provides a 180-day statute of limitations for filing of complaints. See 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.170(b) (1994) ("A complaint must be filed not later than 180 days from the date of the alleged
discrimination, unless the time for filing is extended by the designated agency for good cause shown.").
262. The time bar for these filings is based on state law. See Doe v. County of Milwaukee, 871
F. Supp. 1072, 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
263. 842 F. Supp. 483 (D. Utah 1994).
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the inmate petitioner alleged disability-based discrimination in the correctional
industry's failure to hire him. The court questioned the applicability of the
ADA to prisoner employment and granted summary judgment to the defendants
on that claim.2M In Crowder v. True,' a paraplegic pretrial detainee in a
federal facility raised claims under the Fifth Amendment, the Eighth
Amendment, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Architectural Barriers
Act.' The court invalidated the ADA claim on the ground that the ADA
does not apply to federal agencies or prisons.267
Many claims nationwide have failed under the interpretive scrutiny of the
courts. In Rivera v. Dyett,2 8 a diabetic amputee prisoner sought a preliminary injunction, claiming inadequacy of prison facilities for wheelchair-bound
inmates. The court initially acknowledged the possibility of success on an
Eighth Amendment claim, but dismissed the ADA claim because the plaintiff
"fail[ed] to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits or a sufficiently
serious question going to the merits combined with a balance of hardships
tipping decidedly in his favor with respect to his claim. "269 The court's
unusual distinction-that a claim could reach Eighth Amendment standards
without triggering ADA protections-followed from his failure to show "that
he [was] discriminated against in connection with any evaluation for placement
in a vocational program on the basis of any handicap. "270 Similarly, in
Wgner v. Jett,27 a Kentucky prisoner alleged discriminatory delivery of
food service within the prison. The federal district court granted summary
judgment for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. The Sixth Circuit found
that the plaintiff could not establish the elements of his discrimination claim

264. See id. at 487. The events underlying the claim predated the effective date of the ADA
provisions. See id. at 488; see also White v. Colorado. 82 F.3d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that
ADA Title I does not apply to prison employment); Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932, 937-38
(E.D.N.C. 1996) (stating that ADA does not apply to prison work programs).
265.

74 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 1996).

266. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 4151 (1994) (Architectural Barriers Act).
267. See 74 F.3 at 813. The Rehabilitation Act and Architectural Barriers Act claims failed for lack
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Eighth Amendment allegations were deemed inadequate
and dismissed without prejudice, and the Fifth Amendment (due process) claim survived long enough
to be dismissed in a separate proceeding when met by the defendants' claim of qualified immunity. See
id. at 813-15.
268. No. 88 CIV. 4707 (PKL), 1992 WL 233882 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1992). This case bears some
resemblance to Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 248 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that plaintiff had no claim
under ADA for medical malpractice).
269. Id. at *7.
270. Id. at *9. Ironically, in Candelaria v. Coughlin, 155 F.R.D. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), a
paraplegic inmate's Eighth Amendment challenge to conditions in New York's correctional system
failed, but the court noted that "it is possible that Candelaria has a viable claim against the Clinton
Facility under the Americans with Disabilities Act." Id. at 493.
271. No. 94-5522, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 27812 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1994).
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and affirmed, exercising deference to prison managers' concerns over
operational efficiency.272
In November 1994, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision that could
fundamentally determine the effectiveness of ADA legislation for prisoners.
The case of Gates v. Rowland provides extensive discussion of the various
aspects of prisoner litigation generally and disability-related claims in
particular. In Gates,273 the court held that inmates' statutory rights, like
constitutional rights, are restricted following incarceration. Consequently, the
court reasoned, claims under the ADA and other statutes must be weighed
under the Turner reasonableness test.274 Gates did not eliminate the possibility of prison-conditions reform under the ADA, but it placed the prospects for
such reform almost beyond reach. As with rational basis scrutiny for equal
protection claims, the Turner analysis heavily favors prison management. If the
Gates decision prevails nationally, then the same court that decided Bonner v.
Lewis27 and supported the Rehabilitation Act's applicability to prisoners will
effectively recapture the ground that Bonner provided.
Torcasio v. Murray,27 6 unlike Gates, involved a single plaintiff. In his
original action, prisoner Anthony Torcasio claimed that the facility failed to
accommodate his alleged disability of morbid obesity.277 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claim, but
remanded the case for reconsideration of his Rehabilitation Act and ADA
claims, which were originally deemed moot due to Torcasio's transfer.27 On
remand, the district court reviewed the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on all claims. The court found for the plaintiff on several of the
claims, noting that "a reasonable juror could find [that] defendants' accommodations were unreasonable," and referred the case to a magistrate judge for
further action.279 The defendants appealed the denial of qualified immunity,
and the Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that, "at the time of the alleged
violations, it was not clearly established that these acts applied to state
prisoners or that an obese individual such as appellee Anthony Torcasio was

272. See id. at *3 ("Prison authorities are entitled to adopt and execute policies and practices that
in their judgment are needed to preserve institutional security, even if it requires treating disabled
inmates somewhat differently.").
273. 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
274. See supra notes 236-242 and accompanying text (discussing Turner and judicial deference
generally).
275. 857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988).
276. 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 772 (1996).
277. See Torcasio v. Murray, 862 F. Supp. 1482, 1486 (E.D. Va. 1994).
278. 12 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 1993).
279. 862 F. Supp. 1482 (E.D. Va. 1994). Interestingly, in the appeal that followed, defendants
specifically challenged the applicability of both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA to state prisons
during this phase of the litigation; the district court held both statutes applicable. See Torcasio v.
Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995).
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entitled to the protections of either act. "2t The court did not stop there. It
also asked whether statutes such as the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act apply
to state prisons. The court vehemently rejected Torcasio's claim that this
question was judicially well-established. Implicit within the opinion is a
challenge to the interference of federal law in any "core" state functions.
Potentially, all of Title II could be questioned under the court's logic. Other
courts could easily find in Torcasio support for automatic dismissal of inmate
ADA claims.28 '
Prisoners' rights advocates should be encouraged by several cases that have
28 2
survived procedural and substantive challenges. In Gates v. Deukmnejian,
for example, the plaintiffs alleged that conditions at the California Medical
Facility at Vacaville violated the Rehabilitation Act. A consent agreement was
entered in 1990, but four years later the federal district judge was still levying
fines on the defendants and reinforcing these fines with threats of arrest.
Noland v. Wheatley, 283 decided in 1993, stands as the prototype of a
successful challenge to prison conditions under the ADA. A semi-quadriplegic
inmate brought claims under the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, federal civil
rights statutes, and Indiana jail standards, alleging "deplorable conditions"
regarding colostomy and urostomy bags for waste disposal, pressure sores,
renal problems, padded cells, open drains, lack of running water, stench,
twenty-four-hour camera monitoring, infected ankle sores, and numerous
episodes of exposure to human waste. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss.
The court's holding was mixed. On the one hand, the court dismissed the
inmate's Rehabilitation Act claim without prejudice because Noland failed to
allege receipt of federal funds in his complaint. 2 8 On the other hand, the
court found that the inmate stated a valid ADA claim as well as a valid § 1983
claim for the portions of his complaint based on ADA violations.28s The
opinion confirmed that Title II claims do not require a "right to sue" letter or
the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Further, the court noted that the

280. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1342.
281. See Gorman v. Bishop, 919 F. Supp. 326, 331 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (extending Torcasio to apply
to arrests); Staples v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 904 F. Supp. 487, 490 (E.D. Va. 1995) (expanding
Torcasio and holding that ADA does not apply to state prisons).
282. 987 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1992). The Gates history is extensive, involving both court litigation
and negotiated consent agreements. See, e.g., Gates v. Deukmejian, No. CIV S-87-1636 LKKJFM,
1988 WL 92568 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 1988) (addressing motion to compel document production); Gates
v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1992) (post-consent agreement consideration of requests for
attorney fees); Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) (resolving appeals and cross-appeals
arising from consent agreement); Gates v. Rowland, Nos. 94-15259, 94-15884, 1995 WL 346091 (9th
Cir. June 9, 1995, as amended Aug. 3, 1995) (considering challenge to district court's orders with
respect to use of taser guns and other weapons on inmates); Gates v. Gomez, 60 F.3d 525 (9th Cir.
1995) (regulating prison's use of grenade launcher and holding that it was covered under decree).
283. 835 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ind. 1993).
284. See id. at 481.
285. See id. at 485.
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ADA creates enforceable rights and consequently can serve as the basis for a
claim under federal civil rights statutes.28 6 Finally, the court held that a
defense of qualified immunity is not available against ADA claims unless the
defendant can establish that his or her actions appeared consistent with ADA
provisions. 287 Although not yet fully litigated, Noland has become the
seminal case for attorneys presenting prisoners' ADA claims.
Confirming that nothing in law is either static or secure, the federal district
court in New York decided Clarkson v. Coughlin'8 in the same month that
the Fourth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff's case in Torcasio. Hearing-impaired
289
inmates originally brought a civil rights action including both constitutional
and statutory challenges, 2 ° alleging inaccessible facilities, lack of auxiliary
communication aids, lack of notice and grievance procedures, and failure to
provide qualified interpreters. 291' After years of procedural shadowboxing and
an extensive analysis of the inmates' needs and the defendants' responses, the
court held for the plaintiffs, granting summary judgment and declaratory and
injunctive relief. 2 2
The importance of the Clarkson decision is twofold. First, the prisoners
prevailed after mounting a strong case that the defendants had systematically
refused to accommodate disabled prisoners for years. The individual stories of
inmates, when combined, created a powerful statement of noncompliance. The
defendants' lack of accommodation was comprehensive and had devastating
effects on inmates' daily lives and access to their legal rights. The second
consequence of Clarkson lies in the declaratory judgment and the premises
reflected therein. The federal district court did not question that statutory
rights-the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA-applied to prisons. Moreover, the
court refused to engulf the plaintiffs' claims in a Turner v. Safley 293 analysis.
In the aftermath of the Gates decision, the Clarkson ruling holds some promise
for disabled prisoners.
The bulk of prisoner ADA litigation remains unresolved. Coleman v.
Wilson294 focused on mental-health care in the California state prison system.
A class action alleging deliberate indifference was brought on behalf of 28,000
mentally ill California inmates. The magistrate judge found for the plaintiffs

286.
287.
288.

289.
1038-44.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See id. at 482.
See id. at 488.
898 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

These challenges included Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment issues. See id. at
The
See
See
482

plaintiffs invoked both the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the ADA. See id. at 1035-38.
Clarkson v. Coughlin, 783 F. Supp. 789, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Clarkson, 898 F. Supp. at 1033-35.
U.S. 78 (1987); see also supra notes 236-242 and accompanying text (discussing Turner

test).
294. 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
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and recommended that a special master be appointed to monitor the situation.
The case is awaiting review by the chief judge.2"
The defendants in Outlaw v. City of Dothan296 challenged, among other
things, whether their alleged failure to accommodate an inmate with a severe
skin condition violated the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. 29 The court
298
applied a definitional analysis of the components outlined in the statutes
and concluded that, "under common usage and understanding of the terms, the
jail and all of its facilities, including the shower, constitute a service, program,
or activity of the City of Dothan to which the ADA applies." 29 The court
permitted the plaintiff's case to proceed on these issues.
In Armstrong v. Wilson,3"o a class action suit was filed on behalf of
allegedly hundreds of disabled inmates. Originally filed by nine male and two
female inmates, the suit challenged everything from access to law libraries and
rehabilitation programs to basic issues of security for blind and deaf inmates.
The case was brought against the State of California under both the ADA3° '
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs requested injunctive relief
mandating an end to discriminatory denial of access and requiring compliance
3 2
with structural accessibility guidelines. )
Harrelson v. Elmore County30 3 is also pending resolution. A paraplegic

individual alleged violations of the ADA as well as of the First, Fourth,
Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, based on two periods of
incarceration of thirty-six to seventy-two hours in an Alabama county jail.3 °4
The allegations included deprivation of wheelchair use, lack of a handicappedaccessible toilet and shower facilities, and other injurious conditions of
confinement. 3 5 In August 1994, a federal court granted the defendants'

295. See Bill Kisliuk, PrisonersSue CaliforniaUnder 1991 DisabilitiesAct, RECORDER, June 30,
1994, at 3.
296. No. CV-92-A-1219-S, 1993 WL 735802 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 1993).
297. See id. at *4.
298. This included whether the shower in the jail is a "service, program or activity." Id. at *4.The

court answered in the affirmative. See id.
299. Id. But see Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that provision of
bed for paraplegic was not service, program, or activity covered under ADA).
300. No. C 94-2307 (N.D. Cal., filed June 27, 1994), described in Kisliuk, supra note 295, at 3;
see also Jean Stewart, CaliforniaInmates FightBack, DISABILITy RAG & RESOURCE, Nov.-Dec. 1994,
at 11.
301. See Kisliuk, supra note 295, at 3 ("The suit is believed to be the first time a state prison
system has been sued under the ADA.").
302. See Armstrong v. Wilson, No. C 94-2307, 1996 WL 580847 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 1996)
(denial of defendants' summary judgment motion). The plaintiffs allege that, since the passage of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the California Department of Corrections (CDC) has spent billions of dollars
of public funds on new prison construction and alterations to existing facilities that do not comply with
the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards.
303. 859 F. Supp. 1465 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
304. See id. at 1466 n. 1.
305. See id. at 1466.
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motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, holding that such
damages were not available under Title II of the ADA. 3"
Also awaiting further developments is a claim filed on behalf of blind
prisoners in the California correctional system.3 7 The Vacaville settlement
in Gates v. Rowland3°8 did not address other facilities, and blind inmates
were excluded from that suit. This complaint had been filed with the United
States Department of Justice after the problems with prison administration
could not be resolved. The Justice Department apparently channeled the
complaint to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, then to the California Department
of Corrections, which sent it back to the prison administrators. 3" Subsequently, notice was received that, pending developments in Armstrong, 310 the
larger class action suit, ADA complaints for California prisoners have been put
on hold.311
In summary, little can be extrapolated from the case law thus far. ADA
litigation in prison is still in its relative infancy. Moreover, the holdings that
have emerged are not irreversible. Early cases stumbled over effective dates
and application to federal versus state institutions. Several cases have been
slowly winding through the courts, gaining ground on the question of
applicability in prisons but running headlong into deference theories. The Ninth
Circuit recently has determined that the ADA will be subject to the Turner
analysis, while the Fourth Circuit is beginning to question whether the ADA
should apply at all in prison cases. The Southern District of New York held
that widespread systemic deprivation of access to basic needs and legal rights
will not be tolerated. Several court-sponsored settlements have involved
disability discrimination challenges, but implementation has been slow and
partially successful at best. In the four years since the effective date for Title
II, the case law is neither conclusive nor even strongly indicative. The only
analysis that reasonably can be sustained is that any application of the ADA in
prisons will be limited and cautious.
VII.

STRATEGIC POSSIBILITIES

The problem of disabled, aging, infirm, and terminally ill prisoners is not
a new challenge. With the general aging of the American population and the
changes in sentencing options created by legislative mandates, however, the

306. See id. at 1468.
307. See Ed Eames & Toni Eames, Justice & Blindness, DISABILITY RAG & RESOURCE, Nov.-Dec.
1994, at 12.
308. See supra note 257, Example 3.
309. See Eames & Eames, supra note 307, at 12.
310. Armstrong v. Wilson, No. C 94-2307, 1996 WL 580847 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 1996).
311. See id. For a discussion of the lawsuits brought by California inmates, see 3 PRISONERS AND
THE LAW app. B-112 to -114 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1996).
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size and urgency of demands placed by this12 population have swelled and are
expected to explode within the next decade.1
There is no simple answer to the inevitable expense and unmanageability
of the problems confronting the disabled-prisoner population. Legislative
mandates are but the opening foray. Costs, strategic inefficiencies, the
difficulties of policing an individual facility's adherence to ADA standards, and
the competing-generally overriding-priorities of the prison system combine
to thwart any well-intentioned effort to solve the problems. A comprehensive
solution will require major changes to structures, policies, and attitudes among
corrections professionals.3" 3 Amidst this bleak picture, some courts are
stepping in to guide the results. As discussed above, California corrections
facilities have been and continue to be the subject of judicial inquiry and
orders.314
As simplistic as it seems, the judicial system strives to meet ADA standards
by keeping the disabled out of prison as much as possible. In People v.
Reets,3" 5 for example, the court dismissed an indictment against a deaf-mute
defendant charged with criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance,
noting that "no finding of guilt could fairly be obtained given the circumstances
of defendant's disability."316 In People v. Colon,3" 7 the trial court dismissed
an indictment charging a thirty-nine-year-old mentally retarded defendant with

312. See Morain, supra note 8, atAl (discussing California prison population). Increasing numbers
of new inmates in California carry communicable diseases; one in four carries the tuberculosis virus.
See id. One in five inmates suffers from mental illness or associated problems. California is on the
losing side of several class-action lawsuits addressing the care of mentally ill prisoners. The potential
costs of these combined factors are well into the millions. See id.
313. See Barbara Brown Nichols, Sensitizing Staff, DISABILrrY RAG & RESOURCE, Nov.-Dec. 1994,
at 21. Nichols, the warden of an Ohio facility for adult women, contends that hiring people with
disabilities to staff correctional facilities is the fastest route to improving institutional attitudes and the
experience of disabled inmates. See id.
314. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, Judge OrdersEndto Brutality at High-Tech Prison,L.A. TIMES, Jan.
12, 1995, at Al. Pelican Bay Prison was intended to be a national model for high-tech, high-security
prisons. A federal district judge determined that the state permitted guards to exercise "grossly excessive
force" and that the facility denied adequate medical and mental-health care to inmates. The judge did
not close the facility, but ordered short-term modifications and placed the Department of Corrections
on notice. Complicating the problems at Pelican Bay is the reality that, while the inmate population is
perceived to be the worst of the incorrigible violent offenders, the facility also houses some drunk
driving and drug offenders. See id.
Additional judicial intervention is underway, emerging from the Vacaville consent agreement
litigation and several other suits filed on behalf of mentally ill and other disabled inmates in the
California prison system. See supra Subsection I.A.2 (discussing these issues). See generally 3
PRISONERS AND THE LAW app. B-112 to -114 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1996).
315. 597 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
316. Id. at 579. The court added:
It is fully realized that this court's discretionary power to dismiss in the interest of justice is to
be exercised sparingly, and that a sensitive balancing of the interests of the individual and the
People is required. The present decision is not meant to serve as a general license for disabled
individuals to commit crimes.
Id.
317. 209 A.D.2d 254 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
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sale and possession of controlled substances "in the interests of justice." s"'
In its opinion, the court noted:
The people also point out that defendant's "mild mental retardation" did not impede
her ability to form the requisite criminal intent. But dismissal in furtherance of
justice is a remedy to be used "even though there may be no basis for dismissal as
a matter of law."319

For those disabled prisoners already incarcerated, the best prospect is some
form of early-release or compassionate-parole structure. 32° Texas has a
statutory "special needs parole" option, available for those identified as
"elderly, physically handicapped, mentally ill, terminally ill, or mentally
retarded." 32' A considerable amount of the support for compassionate early
releases is intended to benefit terminally ill prisoners,322 but the structure
allows for expansion to cover disabilities as well.323

318. Id. at 254 (referring to trial court decision).
319. Id. at 255-56 (citation omitted). C. Peter Baker, Agreement Reached on Parole Bill; Va.
House DemocratsMake Few Changes In Allen Anti-Crime Plan, WASH. POsT, Sept. 29, 1994, at Al
(reporting that, in Governor Allen's program, certain nonviolent offenders would be placed in alternative
settings); Eva M. Rodriguez, PanelGives BreakforDiminishedCapacity, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 19, 1993,
at 6. A District of Columbia defendant convicted of bank robbery was initially denied a lighter sentence
based on diminished mental capacity because the judge deemed the robbery to be commission of a
violent crime, precluding leniency of the sort requested. See id. On appeal, however, the court held that
judges have greater discretion than facially apparent in statutory restrictions. See id. As stated by D.C.
Circuit Judge Harry Edwards, "Such lenity is appropriate in part because .. . two of the primary
rationales for punishing an individual by incarceration-desert and deterrence-lose some of their
relevance when applied to those with reduced mental capacity." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
320. Parole reform raises a spectrum of problems, however. While advocates encourage increased
parole for nondangerous disabled prisoners, communities pressure legislatures and prison officials to
restrict parole opportunities. See Lisa O'Neill, RapistFails Mental Test, Won't Be Freed, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 1994, at 1. Corrections officials use psychiatric examinations to deny inmates parole even at
the last minute. The use of this tactic has been controversial; yet, confronted by angry frightened voters,
officials are likely to continue this and other methods for denying or delaying parole.
321. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 42.18 (West 1996) (Adult Parole and Mandatory Supervision
Law). This law also authorizes officials to grant intensive supervision parole to otherwise ineligible
prisoners if prison capacity is greater than 95%. See Ex parte Choice, 828 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992); see also Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494, 1498 n.7 (1lth Cir. 1994) ("Sultenfuss'
tentative Parole Month was later adjusted slightly in conjunction with a periodic review to accountfor
prison overcrowding.") (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
322. See Marjorie P. Russell, Too Little, Too Late, Too Slow: CompassionateRelease of Terminally
Ill Prisoners-Isthe Cure Worse Than the Disease?, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 799 (1994). While the
legislation that exists is geared toward terminally ill inmates, the path is far from smooth. Even where
corrections officials recommend release, judges have been slow to approve these recommendations. See
Susan Sward & Bill Wallace, Inmates Suffer Despite Callsfor Reforms, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 5, 1994, at
Al. (Department of Corrections urged release of bedridden multiple sclerosis patient, but judge refused,
citing prisoner's lack of remorse). Fear of public opinion drives judicial reluctance. See generally
Working Group on Compassionate Release, CompassionateRelease of Terminally Ill Prisoners,in 2
PRISONERS AND THE LAW ch. 14B (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1996).
323. See Yarbaugh v. Roach, 736 F. Supp. 318, 320 n.7 (D.D.C. 1990) ("The Court continues
to encourage the defendants to explore whether a medical pardon is appropriate or whether there is
another facility that can better accommodate plaintiff's needs."); Baker, supra note 13, at Cl; Baker,
supra note 319, at Al. Virginia Governor Allen's plan provides eligibility for early release to inmates
who have served at least 10 years and are 60 or older. See id.
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The success of early-release programs is disputed. Pressure for stricter
penalties is erupting throughout the country. Mandatory sentencing and
abolition of parole are the current fashion. Sooner or later, however, the
monumental costs of prison construction and administration will erode public
enthusiasm for extended incarceration.3 " Early release of disabled prisoners
might find some public acceptance if handled gradually and discreetly. 3"
As an alternative to early release, prisons might accelerate the ongoing
practice of transferring disabled inmates to appropriate medical facilities.
Authorization exists for these transfers where prison facilities are inadequate
to treat a specific medical problem or, rather commonly, where the mental
disabilities of the prisoner require at least temporary relocation to psychiatric
facilities.326 This strategy does not relieve the state of its burden to provide
adequate medical and psychiatric care for the inmate, but it allows some

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines include a provision allowing flexibility in sentencing for disabled
defendants:
Physical condition or appearance, including physique, is not ordinarily relevant in determining
whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range. However, an
extraordinaryphysical impairmentmay be a reason to impose a sentence below the applicable
guideline range; e.g., in the case of a seriously infirm defendant, home detention may be as
efficient as, and less costly than, imprisonment.
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5H1.4 (1994) (emphasis added). See, e.g., United States v.
Ghannam, 899 F.2d 327, 329 (4th Cit. 1990) ("Section 5H1.4 allows downward departures any time
a sentencing court is presented with sufficient evidence of impairment."); United States v. Maltese, No.
90 CR 87-19, 1993 WL 222350, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1993) (finding defendant entitled to
downward departure pursuant to §§ 5H1.1 and 5HI.4 because of defendant's age and extremely poor
health); United States v. Grullon, No. 91 Cr. 141-05 (RWS), 1993 WL 361613, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
14, 1993) (confirming that § SHI.4 authorizes downward departure in sentencing based on physical
infirmity).
Various states have incorporated into their statutory schemes some method for sentence reduction
or amendment, based upon the inmates' health. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.235(10)
(1995) ("The parole board may grant a medical parole for a prisoner determined to be physically or
mentally incapacitated.").
324. There will likely be a growing split between courts that continue to expand capital-offense lists
and those that look for alternatives.
325. This could work-right up until a disabled parolee or compassionately released prisoner makes
headlines for a violent crime. And disability is a relative term, as illustrated in the case of Anthony C.
Garafolo. In 1991, Garafolo was convicted of robbery and sentenced to 15 years' probation-lenience
that the judge attributed to the defendant's paralysis. In September 1993, however, Garafolo "rolled into
one of the same banks he hit during the original crime spree and escaped with $2500 in cash without
showing a weapon. An accomplice helped him pack his wheelchair into a car and drove him off." He
was apprehended and has begun serving.a 15-25 year sentence. See Nation In Brief: Paralyzed Holdup
Man Sent To Prison, ATLANTA J., Nov. 10, 1993, at B7.
326. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 715.59 (1995) (Hospitals for diseased prisoners) ("The
legislative authority of a municipal corporation may provide suitable hospitals for the reception and care
of such prisoners as are diseased or disabled, under such regulations and the charge of such persons as
the legislative authority directs.").
As previously discussed, transfers raise several legal concerns, including retaliatory abuses by prison
administrators and due process protections against peremptory transfer sans full hearing. See supra
Subsection I.A.2 (discussing mentally ill inmates); see also Dwayne Bray, Convicted Molester Avoids
Prison Term, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1994, at B2 (reporting that mentally disabled man convicted of
engaging in sex acts with six-year-old boy was ordered to state hospital after jury declined to send him
to prison).
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shifting of the burden to facilities that may be better able to cope. Admittedly,
the judgments underlying a transfer would be subject to considerable scrutiny
and could not rest simply on institutional efficiencies. Legislation such as the
ADA would act as a bar to excessive transferring of inmates if the transfers
achieved little more than convenient segregation of prisoners requiring
extensive treatment. Nevertheless, the common interests of the disabled inmate
and the prison administration might be served by responsible application of this
option. Moreover, transfer strategies would leave societal concerns for security
undisturbed, as neither transfer into hospitals nor return of transferred
prisoners by medical facilities would result in release of the prisoner into the
327
community.
The motivation to undertake these strategies has not been especially
compelling until recent years. Perhaps the pressure that legislation such as the
ADA places on the criminal justice system will inspire these and other creative
alternatives.
In response to the costs involved and the inefficiently scattered population
of disabled inmates, some prisons have created centralized facilities for
disabled prisoners. It is yet unclear how far this approach can be taken. The
ADA allows for some programmatic efficiencies, and no doubt the courts will
allow prison administrators flexibility in attempting to address these issues.
Should the opportunities and caliber of facilities vary identifiably between
disabled-prisoner facilities and other corrections facilities, an equal protection
issue may arise .328 Even if conditions are similar, however, programmatic
segregation of disabled prisoners would violate a core tenet of the ADA. The
prison context might well prevail, but that conclusion has not yet received
judicial imprimatur. Finally, there is the ideal solution, for both the long term
and the short term: provide decent care for all inmates in the first place. This
goal could be realized only if it were possible for voters to recognize the
potential savings in this approach, which would avoid spending tax dollars for
huge class action lawsuits resulting in systemwide structural change. Lest one
get carried away with idealism, however, it is substantially more likely that the

327. See Zenoff, supra note 38, at 568.
328. It is likely that this will only be a problem if the facilities for disabled prisoners are
considerably worse than facilities for others. If the distinctions are minor, courts will probably offset

the variance with a balance of state interests. If the other facilities are worse, quaere how far a
complaint from that population is going to get. See, e.g., Roe v. Fauver, CIV A. No. 88-1225 (AET),
1988 WL 106316 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 1988):
In [Perez v. Neubert, 611 F. Supp. 830 (D.N.J. 1985)], prison officials had placed an entire
class of inmates, all Marielitos [Cuban aliens] in MCU's in various state prisons. This court
held [i]f we had found that the conditions of confinement of the plaintiffs were substantially
similar to those affecting inmates in the general population we would be proceeding no
further. Mere sequestration under "separate but equal" conditions would not in the prison
context, be cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at *2-3 (internal citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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voters, led by short-sighted politicians, would sooner support legislation
precluding inmates from bringing such actions at all.
CONCLUSION

The perception among legal professionals working on prisoner-litigation
issues is that the impact and ramifications of the Americans with Disabilities
Act have yet to be seen or understood. Even the basic question of whether
courts will apply the ADA to state correctional facilities has not been
definitively settled. The few cases with ADA-related issues do not provide an
adequate indication of judicial intentions. In all probability, there will be a
considerable increase in ADA-based prisoner claims in the next few years. At
the same time, a balancing of judicial activism-which has lessened markedly
since the wave of Reagan and Bush federal court appointments and the election
of a Republican-controlled Congress-and judicial deference to prison
administrators, suggests that the impact of the ADA for prisoners will be
limited.
The effects of the ADA on prison inmates will tend to be felt, if at all, in
the areas of basic prison conditions and equal access to programs and activities.
For egregious cases of discriminatory treatment, the ADA may swing the
balance in favor of the inmate. In traditional disability litigation, prisoners have
often established the conditions-of-confinement prong of the equation only to
fail under the intent requirement.329 With the ADA in place, prisonerplaintiffs may succeed in bypassing that obstacle. Moreover, the nondiscretionary character of the ADA will allow courts to address deplorable prisoncondition cases without appearing to interfere unduly with prison management.
Additionally, the ADA does not require exhaustion of other administrative
remedies, thereby permitting swifter recourse to judicial involvement.
Inmates enduring severely discriminatory treatment, or denied access to the
most fundamental resources within the prison, may find relief through an ADA
claim. It seems unlikely that lower level forms of inequity within prisons will
be remedied to any significant degree. Many factors-including judicial
deference to prison management, the peculiar and restricted constitutional status
of prison inmates, the available defenses of reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship, and a national lack of sympathy for convicted persons-render

329. Petitioners ran into either the "deliberate indifference" intent requirements or the semantic
requirements for "punishment" versus conditions. Among the prime articulators of the semantic obstacle
course is Supreme Court Associate Justice Clarence Thomas. See Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970,
1990 (1994) ("[B]ecause the unfortunate attack that befell prisoner was not part of his sentence, it did
not constitute 'punishment' under the Eighth Amendment."); Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475,
2483 (1993) ("'[P]unishment' has always meant a fine, penalty or confinement inflicted upon a person
• . . [which] does not encompass a prisoner's injuries that bear no relation to his sentence.").
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improbable any substantial judicial attention toward improving the quality of
life of prisoners, even those with disabilities.
The best pro-prisoner scenario would be a judicial attempt to redress the
effects of harsher legislative strategies that reflect a punitive national climate.
It is possible that, with an increased prison population yielding a greater
number of disabled prisoners and less violent offenders locked up for longer
terms, judges will try to restore a balance. The speed with which the prison
population increases is outpacing prison construction. This equation creates
nothing less than a crisis not just of corrections, but of the entire criminal
justice system. Even courts will feel the pressure of limited alternatives and
ever-increasing demand. While this may inspire them to intervene, however,
courts are unpredictable and judicial activism may be spurned in favor of
judicial deference. A third, equally possible course of judicial action would be
to forge a delicate middle path in applying these remedies, leaving prisoners
only slightly better off than they were in the past, and the legal standards and
availability of remedies only slightly clearer for the legal community.
The prospects of the ADA as a meaningful legal remedy for prison inmates
are tied inextricably to the future of the ADA and other civil rights legislation
nationally. With decentralization of legal rights away from federal law and
federal enforcement, civil rights law threatens to become a right without a
functional remedy. Constraints on the ability of inmates to access the courts
will offset the availability of those remedies that are left in place. While the
Republican majority on Capitol Hill will not repeal the ADA, they may well
expand its exemptions until the distinction is unimportant. The strengths of the
ADA may be severely diluted in the next few years. In such a case, the
substance and effect of the ADA for incarcerated populations may be entirely
nullified. Even if the ADA remains substantially intact, its utility for prisoners
may be almost completely eliminated. Courts already defer aggressively to
prison management policies and decisions. If the subjecting of statutory rights
such as the ADA to a Turner-like reasonableness review prevails, only the truly
horrifying scenario of inmate abuse will have a prospect for relief. And if the
Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Torcasio prevails, then victims of even the
worst scenarios will find no relief under the ADA. Simultaneously, the success
of a class action suit in the federal district court in New York sustains hope
that, regardless of the theoretical debate over statutory rights and judicial
deference, clear-cut wrongs will find some relief-eventually.
This Article is replete with unanswered questions and unresolved issues.
Unfortunately, that condition reflects all too accurately the collective state of
knowledge regarding the ADA's possible benefits for prisoners. Ironically, this
stage of legal confusion may prove to be the high water mark for inmates.
With a generally conservative judiciary, a Congress partial to short-term
solutions to complex problems, and a rather unsympathetic public, the answers
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that finally emerge may restrict or altogether eliminate any relief for prisoners
under the ADA.
Notwithstanding the platitude that inmates retain certain constitutional
rights, in practice those rights fade beyond recognition following incarceration.
So, too, will statutory rights-in theory as well as well as practice-if the
decisions of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits are followed. The Americans with
Disabilities Act holds only limited promise for prisoners. Currently, it still
represents a viable weapon in a desperately inadequate arsenal. While the ADA
does not even come close to providing what disabled prisoners need, for now
it is the best alternative they have.
POSTSCRIPT

After this Article went to press, the federal courts handed down several
relevant decisions. In particular, the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Third and Ninth Circuits held that the ADA does apply to correctional
facilities.
In Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht,33° Allegheny County
Jail inmates appealed from an order entered by the district court on May 26,
1995, approving a modification of a consent decree entered in 1989.331 The
consent decree required that jail officials provide services to mentally ill
inmates. 32 The May 1995 order vacated this directive, replacing it with a
requirement that the county provide services to mentally ill inmates through
community-based mental-health programs.333 The plaintiffs asserted that,
because many inmates are ineligible for admission to the community programs,
the limitation established by the May 1995 order violated the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA.334 In resolving this question, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, on August 22, 1996, held that correctional
facilities are within the scope of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.33 5 On
September 20, 1996, however, the court vacated the opinion and judgment,
33 6
listing it for rehearing en banc.
On October 11, 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in Duffy v. Riveland,337 held that both the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act applied to state prisons.338 Duffy, a deaf inmate, filed suits against the
Washington State Reformatory and the Washington State Department of

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

93 F.3d 1124 (3d. Cir.), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 93 F.3d 1146 (3d Cir. 1996).
See id. at 1126.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1130.

335. See id. at 1130-35.
336. See id. at 1146.
337. 98 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1996).

338. See id. at 453-56.
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Corrections after his request for a certified interpreter at a prison disciplinary
proceeding and two classification hearings had been denied.33 9 The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the Eleventh
Amendment afforded immunity for the state entities. 3" Deciding that
Congress expressly provided that states could not claim Eleventh Amendment
immunity from ADA claims and that the Rehabilitation Act had been amended
to the same effect,3 41 the court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded for further proceedings.342
Finally, the federal court in Armstrong v. Wilson 343-after examining
California Department of Corrections surveys finding that the prison system
contained 345 inmates in wheelchairs, 650 inmates with lower extremity
disabilities requiring prosthetics or a walker, 141 hearing-impaired inmates,
and 219 blind inmates 344-denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, and held that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act applied to state
correctional facilities. 345 The suit was brought by a certified class consisting
of past and future inmates with "mobility, sight, hearing, learning or kidney
3 47
disabilities. "346 The court examined the case law of the Third,
348
Fourth,
Ninth, 349 and Tenth35 Circuits, finding the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Bonner v. Lewis 35' to be dispositive and distinguishing the Fourth
Circuit's holding in Torcasio v. Murray.352
Each of the foregoing decisions is consistent with the theme of this Article:
if interpreted reasonably, the ADA can remedy many basic problems
confronted by disabled individuals in prison.

339. See id. at 450.
340. See id. at 451-52.
341. See id. at 452.
342. See id. at 459.
343. No. C 94-2307 CW, 1996 WL 580847 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 1996).
344. See id. at *1.
345. See id. at *2-*7. Armstrong was decided several weeks before the Ninth Circuit reached the
same conclusions in Duffy v. Riveland, see supra notes 337-342 and accompanying text.
346. See Armstrong, 1996 WL 580847, at *1.
347. See id. at *5.
348. See id. at *7 (discussing Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 772 (1996)); supra notes 276-281 and accompanying text (addressing Torcasio).
349. See Armstrong, 1996 WL 580847, at *3-*7 (discussing Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559 (9th
Cir. 1988)); supra Part VI (interalia, discussing Ninth Circuit precedent).
350. See Armstrong, 1996 WL 580847, at *7 (discussing White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364 (10th
Cir. 1996) and Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1991)); supra note 112 (citing Williams and
other cases).
351. 857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act applies to state prisons); see
supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text (discussing Bonner).
352. 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995) (failing to hold explicitly that the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act do not apply to prisons but implying that they do not), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 772 (1996); see
supra notes 276-281 and accompanying text (discussing Torcasio).

